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TOPIC: INTRA-ASEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION
INTRODUCTION
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAIII) was formed it 1967, Its original
members were Indonesi4 Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei joined the
Association shortly after its independence in 1984. Later, in an efFort to get the ten states in Southeast
Asia grouped in the Associatiorl Vietnam was granted the membership in 1995, Myanmar and Laos in
1997 wtd Cambodia in 1999.1 The first two of ASEAN'S seven objectives are:
i. To acc€lerate the economic gÍowth, social progress and cultural devçlopment in the region
throughjoint endeavours in the spirit ofequality and partnership in order to strengthen the
foundation for a prospefous and peaceftl community of South - East Asia nation;
ii. To promote regional peace and stabiþ through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law
in the relationship among countries of the region and adherence of the principles of the United
Nation's Charter;,*z
Since its information, ASEAN has ventured into various fields of cooperation. The two main
areas of cooperation after its inceptíon were security and economic. Through regional cooperation,
ASEAN has minimized manipulation and domination by the great po\¡vers. In 1975, Adam Malik, then
Foreign Mnister of Indonesia, stated that "ASEAN can be see as reflecting the growing political will
of the nations of this region to take charge of their own future, to work out problems of their
developmenl stability and security together and to prevent theit region from continuing to remain the
arena and the subject of major power and conflict,"3
When ASEAN first ventured into economic cooperation, the major concern of the member
states was the security issues in the region. The rationale of its economic cooperation at that time was
to reduce the security threats that might arise had there not been any constructive engagement amongst
the member states.
'ffi clorer to reality wtrcn, ar the ASEAN Foreþ Mini*en MeetirryinJuly 1996 (Indonesia), I¿os
¡rul C¿mbodia¡ubmited úEirapplicatiôns foþhtASEAN inl997. Mymm, rvhich made her debutæ m obæred at th¿ 1996 ASEAN Forcþ
Minísen, is eryectød to folbw ¡uit later,& Iæe Kuan Yew, Frþm Thjrd World tg FirTE The Siriraporç .Storv 1965-2000, (IlarperOollinrFublidrers,
200ó).
2 law and Pmctice unde¡ the G,{IT: ASIAN & APEC compiled and edited by Paul Davideon, (New Yotlc Oceana PublimHoro,
7c)96), p.2.
3Shee PoonKim "A Decade of ASEAN:1967 -7f77," inAsiânSúvey, Vol, 17, No. I, Nryaøt1977,p.754
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This neo - Functional approach to regional integration (i.e., of having cooperation in one field in the
hope that it will spill - over to other areas of cooperation) oan be traced back to the earþ years of
ASEAN. In a study of the ASEAN's first decade, Shee Poon Kim wrote, "[a] growing feeling of
anxiety due to the deteriorating security situation and a desire to complete peacefully with the
Indoohinese stetes could be detected. This mood was reflected in thÊ ASEAN leaders' attempts to
accelerate eoonomic development and to strengthen economic cooperation for fear that unless the
Association showed inviability in the form of oconomic çohesivenees, it might be su¡passed by the
Indochinese states."4 ASEAN's security preoccupation for the eçonomic cooperation is reflected more
clearþ by Stuart llanis when he said, "ASEAN.... used economic cooperation as an instrument rather
than an objective, seeing political benefits emerging from the presumed much less contentious process
of economic cooperation and the enhanced economic interdependence that would follow."s
Despite this belief, it took ASEAN almost nine years to come out with its economic plans. An
obvious factor for this late take - offcan be attributed to ASEAN leaders' laçk of vision in the future
direction of the association at that time. As the then Singaporean Foreþ Minister Rajaratnam,
speaking at the 1974 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, rightly put it, "[y]ou may recollect at the ffrst
meeting ln 1967, when we had to draft our communiqué, it was a very difficult problem of trying to say
nothing in about ten pages, which we did. Because at that time, we ourselves having launched ASEAN,
were not quite sure where it was going or whether it was going anywhere at all.' 
6
Despite its passivity, ASEAI.{ leaders had from time to time, before the 1976 Bali Summit,
proposed certain measures of economio cooperation. The most notable among these proposals mme
from the then President ofthe Philippines in 1971. President lvla¡cos ".... suggested that the 1970s be
declared 'the ASEAI.I Dwelopment Deoade' and that ASEAN est¿blish a limited free trade area in a
selective commodity basis and a payments union within the ASEAN region," 
7 To have suggested such
a free trade area in 1971 was premature. The reservation of ASEAN member states was manifested in
1972, when, chairing the fifth Ministerial Meøing the then Singaporean Prime Minister, Lee Kaun
Yew ".,. gained the impression that ASEAN did not for the present aim at integrating a regional
eÆonomy, It would, therefore, be unrealistic for ASEAN to propose programs and projects which did
elbid.,p,762
5. Harris, Stuart, "The Economic Aapecüs of Security in the Asia / Pacific Region", in lournal of Strategic Studiee, 1995
Special Issue, fl,ondorç Frank Cass, 1995), p. 47 '
o, Quoted in Froet, Frank, "Introduction: ASEAN Since1967 -Origtns, Evolution and Recent Development, "ln
Alison Broinowgki, ed., ASEAN intq the tg90s, (New Yotk: St. Martin's Press, 190), p.5.
T Quoted in Iaw and Practice u4der the GATT, oP' cit.
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not fit into and assist in the consolidation of the respective economic development plans of the five
countries." 
I
The agreement to venture into economic cooperation finally came in 1976, the year ASEAN
held its first summit meeting. The meeting agreed to embark on several measures of economic
cooperatior¡ particularly in large - scale industrial projects and trade liberalization. These measures,
however, had manu problerns; ranging from the lack of political will, to the weakness in regional
planning. Intra - ASEAI.I economic collaboration entered a new phase in l99l when ASEAN agfeed to
partake in economic integration with the decision to achieve an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) in 15
years time.
Economic collaboration in ASEAN can be catogorized into two phases, The first phase of
economic cooperation took place between 1976 - 1991. During this ñrst phases, ASEAN experimented
cooperation in trade and industry at the regional level, In terms of trade cooperation, ASEAI.I agreed to
implement the Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA) as the vehicle to liberalize trade relations
amongst the member states. ASEAN also ventured into large - scale industrialization through the
mechanisms of ASEAN Industrial Projects (APÐ, ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC) and
ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AfVJs). The second phase began in l99l when ASEAN economic
ministers outlined several other programs to consolidate the eústing cooperation mechanisms. The
ministers proposed the establishment of A$EAN Free Trade Area (AFTA); the adoption of the
Common Effective Preferential Treatment (CEPT) as the tool for achieving AFTA the formalization of
growth triangles; and the possibility of signing a tre¿ty on economic cooperation. The main distinction
between the two phases lies in the questiort of economic integration: whereas before 1991, the
characteristic of economic cooperation in ASEAI.{ was loose, the projects endorsed atlhe23ñ ASEAN
Economic Ministers Meeting (AEM) aimed at achieving a truly liberalized marked in a fifteen years
timeframe.
The first phase of economio cooperation in ASEAN (1976 - 1991) had been plagued by
several problems. ASËAN's industrial cooperetion was designed to be flexible for the participation of
both the governments and private sectors. The AIPs were participated only by the govemmentg while
the private sectors were invited to participate with the governments in the AIC. The private seú1ors are
also encouraged to participate in the AIJVs through collaboration with other privarc s€ctors inside and
outside the region. However, ASEAN was not prepared to seriously implement these programs since
t'Ibtd" p.20.
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the member states' focus was directed more towards developing thei¡ own domestic economies. this
was the reason why industrial projects such as the AIPs, AIC and AIfVs could not achieve satisfactory
results, in the area of trade, the PTA could not function effectively as the tool for libe¡alization because
trade relationship amongst the members states werÊ minimal and they h¿d to also protect their own
products. These problems, nonetheless, did not discourage ASEAN from enhancing its economic
collaboration, This is manifested by ASEAN's decision to pursue new economia progfafns as proposed
by the 23d AEM.
The 23d ASEAì{ Economic Ministers Meeting in 1991, which paved the way for the second
phnse of ASEAN's economic collaboration, had adopted an integration measure be agreeing to achieve
and ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by 2008. To facilitate the achievement of AFTA, ASEAì{
a$eed to adopt the Common Effective Preferential Treatment (CEPT) as a tariff- cutting mech¿nism.
ASEAN has shown its maturity by not attempting to cr€ate new industrial projeots in this new package
of economic cooperation.e The decision not to pursue any new industrial projects was very wise
considerirry the meagre success experienced by ASEAN with such projects in the past. The significance
of the 23d AEM is that the member states agfeed to move forward with new economic programs
despite its relative failure in its first phase of economic cooperation. The reason of this transformation
is therefore not purely economic. It can be understood through ASEAN's efforts of strengthen its
institution - building and as its reaction towards economic regionalism elsewhere.
A new perspective o intra - ASEAJrI economic cooperation is, therefore, in order. It will
examine why, despite past failures, ASEAN still wants to continue its economic cooperation in a more
integrative rn¡¡nner. Thus, this perspective will analyse the paradox of a regional organization, with
unstrccessful experience in economic cooperation, trying to intensi$ its collaboration to a degree which
resembles economic integration. This research will examine the rationale behind transformation and
analyse the various kinds of economic cooperation adopted by ASEAN.
The thesis of this paper is that ASEAI.{'S moves toward economic regionalism is motivated by
its realization to strengthen its institution - building, and its need to react against external trends in
regionalism. The paper is organized as follows: section two will consider the theoretical aspects of
economic regionalism, their application to ASEAN, thç reasons behind the recent transformation in
s. Although ASEAN did not adopt new indushial proþts at the 23d AEM, it endorsed eight new producte to be
placed under the AIV approval list. See appendix 2, p, ' ...
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economic c.oop€ration adopted by ASEÆ.I, and the periodization of ASEAN economic cooperation
with 1976 as the beginning of economic eooperatior\ and 1991 as the starting point of economic
integration. Section three will examine the measures taken by ASEAII in economic cooperation, their
successes and failures, and lessons to be learnt from such endeavours. Section four will explore the
nature of economic integtation in ASEAN, with a major emphasis on ASEAÌ\Ï Free Trade Area
(AFTA). The final section will conclude the argument of this paper, pointing to the extent of
integration in ASEAN thus far, and the challenges and opportunities in intra - ASEAN çconomic
cooperation.
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ASEAN AND ECONOMIC REGIONALISM
As a regional organization, ASEAì{ started to promote common e¡onomic programs since its
first summit in 1976. The summit provided for some measures to be taken by ASEAN to enhance
econornic cooperation amongst its members. This coopÉration, defined in broad terms, was the
agreement of ASEAN member states to venture into several mechanisms that can promote economic
gfowth in the region. Eçonomic cooperation denotes "concerted actions aimed at lessening
discrimination in certain arças of common concern."l0 In this regard, the various measures pursued by
ASEAN had the objeotives of lessening discrimination through joint efforts by the member states.
Some of the examples of ASEAN economic cooperation, as envisioned in the 1976 Bali Summit, are
the Preferential Trading Arrangement (PTA), the ASEAN Industrial Project (AIP), the ASEAN
Industrial Complønentation (AIC), and the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIIV).
As ASEAN progtessed, it then saw the necessity to improve its cooperation. From a loose
partnership, it agreed to venture into a deeper one, with the attempt at integrating its economy through
a free trade area by 2003. When the ASEAN economic ministers proposed the establishment of
ASEAN Free Tradc Area in 1991, it can be seen as the turning point of ASEAN into economic
integration. Economic integratior\ referred herg is defined as "various measures leading to a
suppression of discrimination between economic units of national states and (that) the resulting forms
of economic integration can be characterized by the absence of discrimination in various areas,'Il
ASEAN envisions a region of free trade where products can move freely within the region through this
process of integration.
It should be noted, however, that economic integration in ASEAN is still a process, and not
yet an outcome. It ìs pale in comparison with the more advanced integration schemes adopted by the
European Community (EC) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The European
Community comprises of four different forms of integration described by Peter Robsor\ namely "free
trade afea, customs uniofl, common market and economic union."l2 By contrast, ASEAN is only at the
early stage of fonning a free trade &rea, a stage where many controversies are still unresolved. It does
not attempt at achieving the other three forms of integration adopted by the EC.
ro. [¡¡gfu¡6mer, Rolf, "ASEAN Economic Cooperation: A Stock - Taking from the Political Economy Point of View",
in ASEAN Fonomic Bulletin, Vol. 8, No. 2, November \91, p. \84n,
rr. Balasea, Bela, "Toward A Theory of Economic IntegraHod', in Miguel S. Wionczek, ed., Iatin Ameriçan &onomic
Integration: Expe.riences and Prgspects, quoted ln Raþndran, M., ASEANis Foreign Ralatiorrs: A Shift to Collective
Actionc (Kuala Lumpur: Arenabuku, 1985) p.1.
12 Robson, Peter, The Economics of Internationa! lntegration, ([.ondon: Allen and Unwin, 1980), p. 2.
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In comparison with NAFTA the provisions in the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) are still being
negotiated by the member states. There is no legally - binding document signed to facilitate AFTA
instead a mechanism called the Common Effective Preferential Treatment (CEPT) was introduced to
streamline the prooess of ta¡iff- cutting. In NAFTA" however, a binding agÍe€ment was signed by the
contracting parties to facilitate the process ofits free trade area.
The member states of AFTA and NAFTA are also members of the Asia Pacific Eçonomic
Cooperation (APEC). The APEC forum, which also includes other countries in the Pacific Rim,
declares its commitment toward 'open regionalism'. Open regionalism, in the context of APEC, is
"...essentially aimed at regional economic cooperation by Pacific Rim countries for reduction of
barriers to trade, both official, such as tariffs and non - tariffbarriers, and others such as transport and
transaction costs, and in this and other ways at the maintenance of an open world trading system in the
pure GATT spirit."l3 In other words, the APEC process can be understood as an effort to promote
closer relationship amongst the member stàtes while maintaining a positive outward orientation in
trade. APEC's rationale is to "...aohieve regional agreement on trade issues which could not yet be
resolved at the global level."la
There is also another categorization of economic integration provided by J. Tinbergen, namely
' positive' and 'negative' integration. According to Tinbergen, positive integration "concerned with the
modification of o<isting instruments and institutions and the creation of the new oneq for the purpose
of enabling the market to function effectively and also to promote other broader policy objectives in the
union", while negative integration describes 'those agents of integration which involve the removal of
discrimination and restrictíons on movement, such as arise in the process of trade leberalization."l5 In
theory, ASEAN is adopting the negative integfation proaess. This is because ASEAII does not create
new institutions offacilitate its integration, as understood in the process ofpositive integration, rather it
places the new mechanisms for integration under the existing organizational structure. Moreover,
ASEAN strives to rernove discrimination and restrictions that would hinder trade liberalization.
ASEAN's transformation in economic cooperation can be understood in terms of its efforts to
strengthen its institution - building and as a reaction to external trends in the East Asian region and
elsewhere, ASEAN has to respond to the rapid changes in the region, especially in the economic field.
rg. Arndt, H. W., "Anatomy of Regionalism", in Garnaut, Ross and Peter Drysdalq ed., Asi¿ Pacific Regionalism:
Readinqs in Internatiorìal Economic Relationo, (New South Wales: HarperEducational, 1994), p. 90.
1a Bergsten, C. Fre4 "APEC and the World Economy: A Force for Worldwide LiberalizaHor{', irr ibid., p. 218.
ls' Ouoted in Robson, oo. cit., p. L.
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ASEÆ.{'s moves towards economic integration is puzzling considering the fact that it was not
successful in the economic cooperation it attempted since 1976. An analysis of why ASEAN moves
toward integration measures in spite of its failure in the first phase of economic cooperation, which is
the subject of this researct¡ is therefore required. Economic cooperation was basically a secondary
objective before 1991, since the foremost conoorn was the security questior¡ whe're there wêre
perceived th¡eats from the Soviet Union, China and communist Indochina, coupled with existing
tenitorial claims amongst the ASEAN member states. However, these threats have been reduced with
the dissolution of tho Soviet Unio4 the opening of China's market and political reform in Indoohina. In
the meantime, many ASEANI states are experiancing unprecedented gfo\À¡th in their economic. With a
cumulative everage annual growth rate of more than 7 percent, ASEAII countries are having one of the
highest growth r¿tes in the world. (see Table l).
Table I: the ASEAN States : 1995
Source: Monetary Fund,
Intematíonal Monetarv Fund, (Washingtor¡ D.C.: IMF, 1996), Far Eastern Economic Reviqw, Apríl 4,
79D6,pp. ffi- 67, Asiaweek, Aprrla,1996.
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Despite this unprecedented annual growth rate, the total intra - ASEAN trade was minimal.
As table 2 shows, the direction of ASEAN trade was channelled more towards other regions. For
example, ASEAN trade towards the East Asian countries accounted for the most percentage (34.4o/o),
while its trade to the European Community recorded the highest perçentage growth between 1985 and
1990.
Table 2: ASEAN 1985 and 1990
Growth (%)
Source: Kumar, Sree, "Policy lssues and the Formation the ASEAN Free Trade Atea", in Nay4 Seiji,
and Pearl Imada, ed., AFTA: The Way Ahead, (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, t992), p.
73.
This small volume of intra ASEAN trade is one of the reasons for the failure of the economic programs
adopted by ASEAN in its first phase of ecônomic cooperation. Nevertheless, this statistics did not
bother the ASEAN states in planning for newer economic collaboration mechanisms. This is because
ASEAN is motivated to strenglhen its institution - building in light of external trends in economic
regionalism.
The institution - building efforts in ASEAN were intensified at the Fourth ASEAN Summit
in 1992. up to this point, ASEAN was regarded as being successful in the political sphere, especially its
ability to survive communist threats and the major powers struggle in the region. A symbolic gesture of
institution - building in ASEAN was evidenced in the decision made at the Fourth ASEAN Summit
meeting in 1992 to create the post of the Secretary General of ASEAN, with a ministerial status. Before
the summit, there was a post of the Secretary General of the 'ASEAN Secretariat' whose main
executive function was merely to supervise the daily workings of the Secretariat. The decision helped
contribute to the strengthening of the multilateral ties amongst the ASEAN member states. The
intensification of multilateral relations in ASEAN was also enhanced with the decision to
institutionalise ASEAN Summit meeting at the interval of three years beginning in 1992. Before this
decision, the ASEAN Summit was called only ' as and when the need srises'.r6
The organizational change in ASEAN which boosted the institution - building efforts was
16. Before 199¿ ASEAN had held th¡ee summit meetings at no particular intervals. The first summit was held in 1976
(Bali, Indonesia), the second in 192 (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia) and the third in 1987 (Manila, the Philippines).
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basically preceded by the agreement of its economic ministers in the 23'd ASEAN Economic Mnisters
Meeting (AEM) in 1991. The ministers agreed that it was high time for ASEAN to strengthen its ties
tkough additional economic cooperation measures. A marked change of direction can be observed in
the 23d AEM where decisions were made to elevate ASEAN's economic cooperation through trade
mechanisms, namoly; NAFTA the CEPT and the grovvth triangles. The 23d AEM did not propose new
vehicles for industrial cooperation whioh werç ineffectivc in the past. In this regard, institution -
building in ASEAN was carefully designed so that failed economic mechanisms cor¡ld be dropped to
make way for more beneficial economic vehicles.
ASEAN was also reacting against other regional anangements being set up elsewhøe.
ASEAN sees the EC and NAFTA as two economic groups whioh can atrect its trade to the two regions.
In light of antioipated trade loss to both regions, ASEAN's teaction \vas to intcnsrÛ its intta - regional
trade through AFTA, the CEPT and the growth triangles. ASEAN's scepticism towards other regional
arrangements is also indicated by the Malaysian prime minister's proposal to create the East Asian
Economic Group (EAEG - later, East Asian Economic Caucus IEAECI ),tt *d Singapore senior
statesman Lee Kuan Yew's persistent defence of Asian values as being unique from the Western
viewpoint.
There are other explanations in the rationale for ASEAI.{ to start its own integration me&sures.
John Ravenhill identified four reasons why, despite the many incffective cooperation schemes pursued
by the organization, it still opted for greater integrative efforts. They are:
"(l) the search for a new rational for ASEAN
(2) the changing international context, particularþ the growth of regionalism elsewhere
in the world economy and concern that the Uruguay Round would not reach a
successful conclusion;
(3) , fe¿r of investment diversion particularly to China; and
(4) the growing complernentarity of the ASEAN economies, a reflection of structural
changes in 1980s."18 (numbers added)
1z Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad first proposed the creation of East Asian Economic Group (EAEG) in 1991. His
main idea was to bring together the East Asian economies into one g¡oup so that they can act in one voice in
multilateral economlc negotiations. This idea was criticized, particularly by the Weet, as an attempt to form an
economic bloc. The rnixed reactions from East Asi¿n counFies also made this proposal uneuccessfuf eepecially when
Japan gave a cold response to the idea, ASEAN then took ttus proposal as its ptoþt, changing íts name to become
East Asian Economic Caucus (ËAÌÌC). The approach was also changed to become ørly a consultative forum within
APEC, as proposed by lndonesia.
rs. RÂvenhlll, fohn, "Economic Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Chan$ng Incentived', ln Asian Survey, Vol. 35, No. 9,
September 1995, pp.5E3- 4.
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These four reasons can be further simplified into two categories; the first and the last ¿s
institution - building measures, while the second and the third as reaçtions towa¡ds economic
environment outside the region,
Ravenhill's first category of institution - building touches upon the need for ASEAN to
espouse a new rationale for its existence. The agreements on economic initiatives achieved in the 1991
AEM and the 4ù ASEAN Summit in Siugapore (1992) indicated the ASEAN's acknowledgment of the
need to embrace a new raison d'êntre. It was evidenced by then thât the Cold War threats had been
removed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and through the substantial progress of ending the
Cambodian conflict. Therefore, the new economic arrangements adopted by ASEAN served as an
important symbolic purpose for ASEAN as an organization. As ASEAN cän no longer rely solely in
perceived security threats as the raison d'êntre of its existence, the move toward greater cooperation
serves as the motivation for ASEAI{ to maintain the relevance of its existence.
As regards to the ASEAN economiçs' structural change, Ravenhill's fourth reasor¡ "the high
rates of economic growh of the late 1980s, which led to some ASEAN economies being accorded the
title of 'next - tier NICs' (newly - industrialized countries), boosted the confidence of ASEAITI leaders
in the ability of domestic industries to withstand the competitive pressures that would arise from fteer
trade."te This structural change, furthermore, provided ASEAN with the much - needed push towards
institution - building. Seen from this angle, the integration process in ASEAN is 'natural', a function of
economic growth in the region.
Ravenhill's seçond reason5 ASEAN's reaction towards other regional integration elsewhere,
finds its rationale irr the changing tends in international economic anangements. This line of argument
is justiñed by an econometric study which estimated that 'ASEAN will lose 4Yo of the value of its 1988
exports to North Amcrica from the trade diverting effects of NAFTA and ïYo of the value of its
expofts to the European market from trade diversion caused by the conclusion of the Single European
Market."20 Although the loss was still in a single digit percentage toward each region, ASEAN
appeared to be unwilling to take any chance from such losses.
Finally, Ravenhill has rightly pointed out to the fact that ASEÆ.{'s move towards economic
integration was also influenced by the fear of investment diversion. The most salient threat to the




European and Northeast Asian transnationals and by Chinese business communitios in Southeast
Asia."2l With this relative opening of the huge Chinese market, ASEAN attemptod to create a more
attractive home for foreigrr investment which it hopes can be achieved through concerted economic
effìcrts.
Economic regionalism in ASEAN, ther¡ is an attempt to focus on economic integration
tkough a free trade aroa. The characteristics of this integration are very loose, negative and differ from
those of NAFTA and EC. The transformation from a loose cÆoperation (1976 - l99l) to economic
integration (1991 onwards) in ASEAN is not a function of past successes in its efforts. This is because
ASEAN failed to achieve impressive outcome in the eoonomic cooporation efrorts which began since
197ó. Rather, this process of integration is triggered by the motivation of institution - building and the
need to react to external regional economic trends. In this regard, ASEAN considers economic
integration to be a tool for strengthening its organization while preparing itself to stand against other
regional economic trends that may jeopardize its mÊmber states' economies. The whole process of intra
- ASEAN economic cooperation can be further analysed from two distinctivc phases: economic
cooperation since 1976; and economic integration from 1991 onwards.
Periodization of Intra - ASEAN Economic Initiatives
There are two distinctive phases in intra - ASEAN economic initiatives. The first phase,
economic çooperation, began in 1976 while the second phasq a transition to economic integrution,
began in lote 1991. This periodization focuses on the institutionalisation of economic cooperation in
ASEANI. While institutionalisation during the early years was generated mainly by security
cooperation, ASEAN has givør economic cooperation a more serious approach after 1991 to maintain
its relevance as a regional organizatìon. This periodizatior¡ therefore, considers the agreement for
embarking on the economic projects as the Etarting point of each period. It does not conceive the
achievement ofeach projects as the periods in economic cooperation in the region. The rational behind
thìs periodization is to understand the dynamics of the decision - making process in ASEAN and the
visions ofthe ASEA}{ leaders in strengfhening their eçonomic cooperation.
A comprehensive periodization on the progtress of ASEAN is given by Frank Frost. Frost, while writing
in 1980, identified three periods (1967 - 1975,1975 - 1976,1977 onwa¡d) as significant dates in the
evolution of the organization.22
zr. Ibid.
zLF¡ost, in Alison Broinowsþ ed. cit., pp, 1 - 13.
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According to Frost, the earþ years of 1967 - 1975 were insignificant in that the member
countries r /ere not quite sure on the direction they wanted to go. Not much progre$s was achieved
during this period and the organization lvas practically run by the Foreþ Ministers who met once a
year.
Frost then went on to characterize 1975 - 1976 as the turning point in ASEÆ.I. The year 1975
was significant because it was the year the non Communist regime in Çambodia and South Vietnam
collapsed, and ASEAN had to re$ponse to this phenomenon in unison. As for 7916,it was historical fro
ASEAN since the first He¿ds of Government Meeting was held in Bali, Indonesia. It was here that two
important declarations were signed, namely; the ASEAN Concord, and the Treaty of Amity and
Cooperation. Whereas the latter concerned with security arrangement in the rçgion, the former was the
documented agreement reached by the heads of government in their meeting. The ASEAN Concord,
among others, outlined four areas of economic cooperation: "cooperation on basic comrnodities,
particularþ food and energy; cooperation in the established oflarge - scale ASEAN industrial projects;
cooperation in intra - regional trade liberalization; and joint approaches to international commodity
problems and other wodd economic problems."z3 Frost's analysis of ASEAN;s dovelopment snce 1977
provides explanation and critique of the various ASEAI.{'s efforts since the Bali Summit in various
areas of collaboration. Frost's analysis of ASEAN development was wide * ranging, taking into
account the development of ASEAN and the Southeast Asian region in political, economic and security
issues. In the economic sphere, the cooperation began ln.1916.
Economic cooperation, then, is considerçd to begin with the endorsement of ASEAN's heads
of government to pârticipate in the endeavours in 1976. The rationale for this periodization is that in
1976, ASEAII leaders agreed for the first time to attempt collectively at participating in economic
ptojects through the regional organization. In other words, the economic cooperation measures taken
by ASEAN in the ensuing years were dependent upon the agreement reached in the 1976 Bali Summit.
Among the projects discussed at the first Summit were the Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTAs),
the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIPs), ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures (AIIVs) and ASEAN
Industrial Complementation (AIC). Those projects became the comerstone of intra - ASEAN
economic cooperation with its different stories of relative success and failure. With the instrurnent of
various eçonomic committees and the institution of ASEAN Economic Ministers' Meeting (AEM), the
23.Þid. p.9. For the full text of the ASEAN Concord, see Appendix 1'
I
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economic projects were fl¡fther reviewed and altered, until ASEAI.{ agreed on some new progfams
following the 23Å ASEAI{ Eoonomic Ministers' meeting in October 1991. These programs reflected a
different characteristics in comparison with the ones it had before.
The 23d AEM was held in Kuala Lumpur on October 7 and 8, 1991. It emphasized "the need
for ASEAN to adopt timely and efFective measures to strengthen its intra - and extra - ASEAN
economic cooperation."2a It was here that the economic ministers discussed and agreed on new
initiatives in economic relations, namely: the Common Effective Preferential Treatment (CEPT); the
'C¡rowth Triangle Corrcept'; and the establishment of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). The
meeting also agreed to change the name of the controversial AEST Asian Economic Group (EAEG) to
the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), and adopted it to be an ASEAN project. The meeting also
discussed the possibilþ of "an ASEAN Treaty of Economio Cooperation which could be signed by
the ASEAN heads of government in the ASEAN Summit the following yer."25 However, it was
decided that a treaty was not necessary; instead "a framework for agreement, which is a less legally
binding document, was chosen."2ó The statement issued at the end of the AEM states that "[t]he
Ministers decided to treat the new initiatives as paft and parcæl of an integrated package towards the
creation of a truly liberalized ASEAN market."z7
The year 1991, then, was another significant period in ASEAN economic cooperation. It was
the year ASEAN economic ministers ag¡eed to venture into economic integration, through a free trade
area, which is to be achieved by 2008. The recommendations put fonvard in the 23d AEM were then
endorse{ by the ASEAN heads of government in the 4ú ASEA}I Summit meeting in Singapore the
following year (1992). Although the formalization of these mechanisms were endorsed in 1992,
ASEAN eçonomic ministers had extensively discussed their possibility to become part and parcel of its
collaborative efforts during the 23d AEM in 1991. Therefore, the 23"d ASEAN Economic Mnisters
Meeting was significant in paving the way to such transformation. It shows that ASËAN has
strurgthened its organizational structure to the extent that the AEM could contribute to the future
direction of ASEAI.{. The 23'd AEM, therefore, serves as the turning point of ASEA}{ economic
cooperation. It was a manifestation of ASEAN members states' commitment to tighten the loose
economic cooperation they had before and to further enhance their cooperation institutions.
2a The Xinhua General Ove¡eeaq News Service, October 8, 1991. For the full text of the 'Joint Pw Statement of the 23rd Meeting of
the ASEAN Economic Ministers, Kuala Lumpur, Malayaia, 7- I October 1 991" , eee Appenòlx 2.
2s_lþiaL
26 Pangeshr, Mari, F{adl Soesaeho and Mubariq Ahrrrad, "A New l¡ok at Intra - ASEAN Economic Cooperation " ln ASEAN
Economic Bulletin Vol. & No. 3,lllatcJt.1992, p. 347. For the full text of "Framework Agreemerrt on Enhancing ASEAN Economic
Coopetatiorf', w Appendix 3,
27 The Xi¡hua Overeeas Newe Setvíce, October 8, 1991.
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ECONOMIC COOPERATION
Economic cooperation in ASEAN began in 1976. The ASEAN Concord, also known as the
Bali Declaration in 1976, issued after the very first ASEAN Summit meeting, mentioned four types of
economic cooperation: "cooperation in basic commodities, particularly food and €nergy; cooperation in
the establishment of large - scale ASEAI.I industrial projects; cooperation in intra - regional trade
liberalization; and joint approaches to international commodities problems and other world economic
problems."28 Of these projects, the cooperation in large - scale industtial projects and intra * regional
trade liberalization were given more emphasis by ASEAN. Furthermore, ASEAN has made some
substantial progress in these two areas.
There are three programs in large - scale industrial projects, namely; the ASEAN Industrial
Project (AIP), ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC), and ASEAI.{ Indust¡ial Joint Venture
(AIJV) In addition, the regional trade liberalizatiort was facilitated by the Preferential Trading
Arrangement (PTA). These four projects originated ftom the recommendations by a United Nations'
Study Group commissioned by the ASEAN foreign ministers in 1969. The main objectives of the
recommendations was to "promote import - substitution on a regional scale, in which regional - wide
industrial planning would provide some oompensation for the expected imbalance in gains from
liberalization of intra - regional trade;'Le This idea was indeed in lieu with the spirit of the time where
development countries were urged to adopt an import - substítution strategy. Howeve¡ when this
experiment was done at the regional level, the result were not so impressive since the member states
had to also develop their own industries.
The lack of progtess in the first phase of ASEAN economic cooperation can be attributed to
several factors, which mostly linked to politícal will and weak organization¿l structure. Ravenhill
observed that "[n]ational jealousies over competing plans for import substituting industries, poor
projeø preparation, and excessive bureaucratisation have stymied ASEAN's various efforts at
industrial cooperation,"3o In short, competing national interests that could not be harmonized were the
major stumbling block. In addition, ASEAN's organizational structure was very weak as a consequence
for the lack of institution - building efforts, No real decision - making porÀ/er was given to the
organization's secretariat, and there "have been excsssive reliance on state planning especially as the
ß Frost, inBroinowrki, ed., op. cit., p.9.
ze'Ravenhill, op. ciL p,851
æ. Ibid.. p.853
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bure¿ucratic infrastructure necessary for such a strategy was very weak and divided, the common
Secretariat being little more than a 'mailbox'."31
Another major hindrance in this cooperation was the issue of trade policy. [s trade policy a
responsibilþ of a supranational body like ASEAIrI? From the political economy perspective, as
Langhammer argued, trade policy should be the responsibility of the national government. It can be
transferred to the suprartational authority when this qualification is met: "[t]o quolify trade policy as a
supranational or regional task, one would expect a sizable share ofintra - regional trade in total trade
of mémber courltries as this would indicate a cert¿in degree of trade policy interdepencd'.3z However,
this sizable share of intra - regional trade was lacking in ASEAN, as Table 3 shows.33
Tqble 3: share of Intra - ASEAN Total Export
1967 1970 1975 1980 1985 7990 1994
20.9 21.4 17.2 179 19.7 17.7 ?Ã.8
Source: fohn Ravenhill, "Economic Cooperation in Southeast Asia", in Asian Survey, Vol. 3Ð
No. 9, Septembet 1995, p. 851, and Sree Kumar, "Policy Issues and the Formation of the ASEAN
Free Trade Ared', in Seiji Naya and Pearl Imada, ed., AFTA Tlle Wav Ahe3d' (Singapore:
tnstitute of Southeast Asian Studies,1992), p.73,
The table shows that total intra - ASEAN trade between 1975 a¡d 1990 was smaller than the years
before 1975, i.e., the period bcfore the economic cooperation measures wero taken, The unimpressive
outcornes of ASEAN's cooperation in trade can be attributed largely to this small size of intra -
ASEAN trade volumes. Thig and other problems, will be addressed in the following sub - sections
which are going to discuss the projects and progtams carried out in the first phase of economic
coopøation in ASEAN.
The Preferential Trading Arrangementg
The agreement on ASEAN Preferential Trading Arrangement @TA) was signed in Manila on
February 24, 1977. the PTA agre€ment aimed at encouraging "gÍealer intra - regional trade through the
use of long - term quality contracts, preferential terms for financing imports, preferential trçatment of
imports by government agencies, preferential tariff rates, and liberalization of non - tariff barriers to
regional tr&de."34 Under these arrangements, the member states were to grant trade preferences to one
31. BloñqviÞt, HanB C., "ASEAN as a Model for Thtrd Wo¡ld Regi<rnal Economic Cooperatio,nZ, in ASEAN Economic Bulleti+ Vol. 1Q
No. 1, July 1993, p. 57.
s¿ Lmghaumer, oo. cit-, p,742,
æ See also Table Z p. 14. For a dehile4 æunby - þ - country ahare of toþliñt¡a - 'q.5EAN hade, eee Table A.? Appendix 5.a Tarv Geral4 "ASEAN Preferentíal Trading Anangemenb: An Overview," ln Sandhu, K.S., Sharon Siddique, eb al,, The ASEAN
Reader, (Singapor€: InÊtlhrte of Southeast Asian Shrdiæ,7992)'
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another on a selective basis. The member states were to lower their ta¡iffs on trade items as agre€d
beforehand through the PTA lists. The instruments to be used for granting such proferences were: long
term quality contracts; purchase flnance support at preferential interest rates; preference in the
procurement by government entities; extension of tariff preferences; liberalization of non - tariff
measures on a preferential basis; and other measures. These preferential arrangements \¡vere to apply to
basic commodities, partioularþ rice and crude oil products of ASEAN Industrial Projects; products for
the expansion ofintra - ASEAN trade; and other products ofinterest to the contraçting states.
The main issue surrounding the PTA was that it was not extensively used. Mari Pangestu, et.
Al., attributed the low utilization rates of the PTd from 1977 to 1987, to the following implementation
problems: "inclusion of inelevant or un - traded items; too detailed disaggregatioq tariff preferences
on zero tariff items; non - automatic acceptancæ of product based on proof of origin and ASEAN
content of the product; and long exclusion lists comprising the relevant products."35 At the Manila
Summit (1987), several improvements of the PTA were made, in which the agreement stated: "ASEAN
shall adopt and carry out a package of measures for the improvement of the PTA. Such measures shall
include the progressive reduction in the number of items in the member countries' exclusion lists and
the deepening of the margin of preference for items currently in the PTA. ASEAN shall also relær the
ASEAN - content requirement in the Rules of Origin on a case - by - cas€ basis."36 The ensuing
discussion on these improvements agreed that "each member states should reduce the items on its
exclusion list suchthat by 1992,the items do not Írmount to more than l0 precent of the numberof
items traded by each nation and the value should exceed 50 percent of intra - ASEAN trade.l1
As it turned out later, however, the PTA had only been able to produce negligible results.
Langhammer identifies several reason for this meagre success, namely; "insufficient product coverage
and depth of tariff cuts, the insignificance of taríff baniers relative to nofl - tariff barriers, and the
possibility of tariff redundancy."3s Despite this failure, ASEAN has consistently attempted to improve
this mechanism where structural changes and procedures for the inclusion of new items to the PTA list
have been updated annually.3e It should also be noted that constant updating ofthe PTA has served as
the basic framework of another preferential trading anangeùent, the Common Effective Preferential
Treatment (CEPT), to be discussed later in this paper,
i5'Pangestu, et, al., op. cit,, p.335.
ø. "The Manila Declaratiotç" in Brolnowski, ed, e,-!iú p. 243, (Appendix A).
37.Pangeshr, et. al,, op. cit,, p.33ó.
ß Langhammer, op, cit,, p. 742.
3e.Panoestu. et. al.. oo. cit.. o,33ó.
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ASEAN IndusúÌ¡al Projects
The ASEAN Industrial Projects (APÐ began inl980. The idea of having the AIPs was
discussed and endorsed at the B¿li Summit of 1976. its origin can be traced back to the
recornmendations made by a United Nations' Study Group n 1972. The report listed eleven industries
considered suitable "for oooperation development by the ASEAN countries, either alone or in
cooperation with Cambodi&, Laos, Vietnam, South Korea, and Sri Lanka."o The study urged a package
- deal approach to distributing the projects among the various countries. This means that a group of
projects would not be allocated individually to each country; rather they should be assigned
simultaneousþ to a gfoup of cour¡t¡iæ for reason of f¿irness,
As regards to the projects, the ASEAN heads of govemment, in the Declaration of ASEAI.{
Concord of1976 declared that:
tr(2) Industrial Cooperation
(Ð Member states shall cooperate to establish largo - scale ASEAII{ industrial plants,
particularly to moet regional requiremsnts of essential commodities.
(ii) Priority shall be given to projeots which utilize the available materials in the member
stâtes, coritribute to the increase offood production, increase foreþ exchange and create
employement."al
Having agreed to adopt this project, the ASEA}{ economio ministers who met after the
summit selected the allocated these five projects:
TABLE 4: Industrial
Source: A Business International Asian Research Report,
lvlarket. (Hong Kong: Busi¡ess International Asia / Pacific Ltd.,1979), p- 69
The cooperation nature of this project was such that every member states was to invest in all the
projects, with the host state providing 60% eqity of the total i¡tvestment. However, the l@/o equity to
be provided by the other four stâtes did materialize even at the beginning stage.
4' A Bueiness lnternåtional Aslan Research Rqrort, ASEAN: Challmgee of An Inüegrating lVlarket, (I{ong Kong:
Businese International Asia r/ Pacific Ltd,,1979),p.@.
a. Declaratlon of ASEAN Corrco¡d.lW6, heading B. Economlc, no. 2, in I¿w and Practice.under the GAfi, op. cit. See
aleo Appendix 1.
,)-
In the urea project, Singapore wanted to withdraw completely but later decided to provide on
percÊnt ofthe equity, leavíng the other 13 percent to the other three countries. Singapore's decision was
influenced by the fact that o'...for and ASEAN project to quali$ for concessional Japanese financing,
the equity in each projeÆt must be held jointly by the five ASEAN countries."42 This shows that the AIP
was having a problem even 0t the very initial stage. There was a relucttnce on the side of Singapore to
participate in this industry because it did not have any interest in the products. Singapore's change of
attitude, on the other hand, shows the importance of partnership with Japan at a time when ASEAN
was embarking on economic cooperation. In 1978, Japan promised to provide US $1 billion on
conce$sional terms to help finance the five projeøs.43
Having done feasibility study and with Japan's assurance for concessions, ASEAN economic
ministers sþed the AIP agreement in 1980, However, of these five projects, only the two ure¿ projects
in Indonesia and Malaysia were operational. Between the two, about 85 percent of the Indonesian
project's urea exports were absorbed by the other ASEAN countries.a The AIPs failed because
ASEAN was too ambitious in structuring the projects under the regional organization. It should be
noted, however, that where there is a production capability, the projects can be easily canied out. The
fact th¿t the urea projects were feasible was because Indonesia and Malaysia already had the needed
production base, Short ofthis needed production base, the other three projects did nø materialize.
The main reason for AIPs failure, then is that it should not have taken place in the first
instance. There were good reasons ficr regional organiz.ation not to engage in this field since the
responsibility for industrial targeting should be in the hands of national government. Langhammer
suggests some reason for regional organizations not to engage in industrial projects. Firstly, industrial
targeting "hand often proven to be ineffective at the national level because ofexternal shocks, planners'
inadequate knowledge of future market conditions and / or dispute between the central government and
the federal st&tes on regional policies inside an economy."45 Therefore, intra - country level of
economic managemçnt u/as prone to have problerns since although the ASEAN merfiber states were
collaborators, they were also competitors. Secondly, "the assumption that industri¿l targeting within
ASEAIrI was a national job from the very beginning is supported by the experiçnce that it was costless
to all member countries to run competing national policies against the AIPs."a6
a2 Business International Asia Research Report, op, cit., p. 70.
øþ¡d..9.71..
4¿ Chåtte4ee, in Broinowsþ ed,, op. cit.. p, 68.
6'Langhammer, op. cit., p. 140.
*,Ibid.
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Another reason for the incompatibilþ of these projects is to be found in the government and
private sector roles. Seiji Naya and Mchael Plummer do not see much of a future for the AIPs because:
firstly, "government - to - goverffnent projects of this type are generally difñcult to negotiate between
all ASEAN countries as they tend to maximize bureaucratic interference," and secondly, 'to the sxtend
that they complete (or potentially complete) with private sector productioq AIPs can be detrimental to
private seúTor development; these projects are inherently incortsistent with the current privatisation
trend in ASEAII.'47 It is çlear, therefore, that ASEAN cannot deal with the clashes of interest between
the different national and private polioies of the member states. In other words, the AIPs were
inconsistent with the decentralized economic decision - making in private - sector based economies,
and they collided with national industrial policies.
The ASEAN Industrial Complementation
The 1976 Bali Summit also discussed another industrial scheme which could complement the
AIPs. It was named ASEAN Industrial Complementation (AIC), and after some discussions, the basic
agreement on ASEAI.{ AIC (BAAIC) wæ approved by the ASEAN foreign ministers in June 1981. Its
basic idea was to extend intra - ASEAÌiI industrial collaboration beyond just equity participation, a
method used by the AIPs. It involved "liberalization of ASEAN trade in intermediate products at
various phases in the production of a final product which has to be assembled in ASEAN."48 The
rationale of the project was that "[i]f industrial projects are integrated in a vertical manner so that
production units specializing in the manufagture of parts are located in difrerent countries, the
commonality of interests of the participants might be improved.'ae Put simply, different states were to
produce certain items where they have the expertise and produøion capabilities, and to exchange the
items through trade with other stâtes participating in the scheme.
At its initial stâge, the AIC scheme focused on the automotive industriçs, ASEAN member
states were recommended to venture into the automotive collaboration by the ASEN Automotive
Federation (AAF) in 1976. This recommendation urged the ASEAÌiI states to undertake product
exchangg which was obviously the main idea of the AIC scheme. However, the member states could
not agree on the allocation of products among themselves, and by October 1983, only one project was
a7, Naya, Seiii and Michael Plummer, "ASEAN Economic Cooperati,on in the New lnternational Economic
Ënvironment " in AQEAN,Econo¡nic Bqlletin Vol, Z No. 3,Mæch7997, p.272'
{.Naya and Plummer, op. cit.. p.264.
¿s. Chatterjee, in Broinowski, ed., op. cit. , p. 69.
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undertaken under the AIC scheme. By the end of 1985, the total trade valuo of the AIC automotive
project amounted to just over US $ lmillion, which was "no moro than one percent of total intra -
ASEAN trading"5Û The problem was also aggravated by Malaysia's and Indonesia's decisions to
emba¡k on their own automobile industry in the earþ 1980s.
The AIC then adopted a Brand to Brand Complementation @BC) scheme, with the similar
main objective of products exchange among the participating countries. However, unlike the first AIC
scheme which needed to be decided by ASEAIII economic ministers, the BBC scheme ainred at
allowing "the private sector to determine the division of production."sl Under the BBC scheme,
ASEAN attracted many foreign automotive companies to participate in its effofts, the first being
Mitsubishi, whose project was endorsed at the 1987 Manila Summit; later followed by Volvo,
Mercedes Benz, Nissan, Toyotq and the DAF group from Belgium, whose projects were approved as
of the 22ñ AEM (1990),t2 This automotive collaboration was only participated by four member states,
excluding Singapore and Brunei. As these projects are still in progress, not much is known of its
progress and future prospects. Meanwhile, ASEAN agreed to extend the BBC prog¡am to include non -
automotive products in the 23d AEM (1991).
Before the introduction of the BBC, the main hindrance of the AIC was "the absence of
established goals and guidelines which are shared by the interested private sector bodies and the
respective ASEAÌ{ governments."53 Furthermore, the AIC was handicapped by a certain lack of trust
amongst the manber states involved in the projects as evidenced in the decisions of some members to
start their oïvn automotive industries. the BBC, the, saved this aspect of collabor4tion with a more
flexible approach toward the set up of the projects. In contrast with carlier ASEAN economic
initiatives, the private seú:tor was given the discretion to determine the division of production.
Furthermore, the lengthy bure¿ucratic process which had to be faced by other projects was also cut
down by allowing the Committee of Industry Minerals and Energy (COIME) to work with the private
sector in specifying the "brand, type, rnodel, coñponents and parts, as well as the product allocation
among pæticipating countries."5a The future of the BBC is bright, as Pangestu, at. al., rightly noted,
"[t]he BBC scheme has better chancæ to succeed than the other ASEAII{ programs because there is quid
pro quo." t5
so. tbiü
sr'Pangestu, et al., op. cit.. p.338.
sz lbid.
ts Chatterþ, in Broinowski, ed., oP. dt . pp. 69- 7O
s Pangestu. et. al., op. cit.. p.33E.
55. Ibid.
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The ASEAN Industrial Joint Ventures
The ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIIV) was introduced in 1993 with the aim at
promoting intra - ASEAl\f investment. Unlike the AIPs and AICs where the paficipation came mainly
from national governments, the AIJVs encour¿ge the collaboration of private sectors and governments
in industrial projects. The AIJVs also constitute yet a further step towards fleúbility of procedures and
decentralÞation from the 'all countries participation requirement' of AIPs and AICs. Its flexibility and
decentralization can be seen through the requirements that "only two ASEAN countries needed to
participate (and approval became less complicated), joint ventures with foreign capital were
encouraged, and AIWs could be of any scale."5ó To make the program more attractive, its requirements
were made to be different from the AIPs and AICs. The AIfVs should be participated by at least two
ASEAN countries in a project where their combine equþ should be more than 5l percent and no one
ofthem should contribute less than 5 percent to the project. Their partner can come from any country
or private sector outside ASEAN. However, an ASEAN - wide AIIV was more encor¡raged, with the
goals of having a full ASEAN participation in the projects.
the minimum equity requirement was then relaxed at the 1987 Manila Surnmit such that
applications submitted before December 1990 could have a minimum ASEAì{ equity of 40 percent.
However, the tendency to extend the deadline happoned wher¡ at the 1990 AEM the equity waiver was
extended to December 1993; the 5 percent minimum equþ of ASEAITI partners was also waived; and
the exclusivity privilege whereby protection is given in the form of restrictions to setting up a similar
project under AIJV within a specified period of time was eliminated.sT
Despite these several changes, AIJV also suffered discouraging response. As of March 1992,
only l8 products have been granted AIIV accreditation.s8 Arnong the charaøeristics that can be
observed in the AIry scherne \r¡ere: "a majority of AIJV have foreign equity participatiory there are
very few ASEAN - wide AIJV and there is only one AIIV having equity participation by all countries;
there a¡e problems with exporting, with some experiencing great difficulties in getting the margin of
preferenÇe ftom the participating ASEAN countries; and plants and locations are ooncentrated in
Thailand and Malaysia."se
s.Naya and Plummer, op. cit., p,265.




In looking at its lack of progress, Langhammer suggested that the scheme "seems to be
redundant (or at least not very relevant) for the private seotor."60 This means that incentives offered by
the scheme were not attractive enough or that they are simply redundant with the interests of the private
sectors in ASEAN states who can well funotion outside the framework of AIJV, The factor of
promotion was also important since the information about AIJV was not disseminated widely
Therefore, awareness of the scheme is low amongst ASEAN entropreneurs and foreign investors.
Arrother problem was the bureaucracy. The 'lengthy bureaucratic process of application' requires the
intorested party to obtain support from relevant government and has to wait for the goveñments
concerned to agree and decide on the scheme, which can take a lot of time.61
Lessons from the First Phase of Intra - ASEAN Economic Cooperation
The first fifteen years (1976 - 1991) of economic cooperation in ASEAN was not very
successful. Looking back at the region in this phase of economic cooperation, one would see the
diversity and heterogeneity of the region as the major ohallenges faced by the member states. ASEAN
member states are diverse in terms of economic development, political orientâtion, culture, history and
religion. In its economic characteristics, it has the mixture of 'North' and 'South', in which; "[t]here is,
on the one hand, the highly industri¿lized, affluent and small economy of Singapore, while on the
other, the large, less affluent and rather dualistio economies of Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand.
Then there is Malaysia which is medium - sizg natural resource rich and relatively affluent; and finally
Brunei which is afluerrt but structurally very different from the othcr five economies."62 This different
level of economic development has indeed and adverse effect on ASEAN's collaborative programs.
ASEAN seems to have taken its intra - regional economic cooperation for granted. As in the
case of the PTAs, AIPs, AICs and AIJVs, the member states designated the programs tó the
zupranational body. Thus, in the meetings of the AEM, consensr¡s can hardly be reached on substantive
issues. This is further aggravated by the fact that ASEAN member states were focusing more on extra -
ASEAN trade. Langhamrner had rightly noted this when he said, "[g]iven this strong orientation of ¿//
ASEAN member countries toward extrâ - ASEAN trading patterns, there is much reason to argue that
national trade policies are wideþ independent from each other and thus can be dcfined as a national
and not supranational job."u'
fl.Langhammer, op. cit,, p. 141.
ól Pangeshr, et, al., op, cit.. p.337,
6z Chatþriee. oo. cit.. o. 143.
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Yet another critical iszue in eoonomic cooperation concerns with the question of authority for
industrial planning. Since ASEAN could not develop an integrated economy due to its economic
structure and complementarity, like trade policies, a supranational body cannot be given the
responsibility of industrial targeting. This is speciaþ true in the case of AJPs and AICs which pointed
to the fact that they should be initiated by national by national governments, not ASEAN. The failure
of the AIPs and AICs "bears witness to the responsibility of national authorities for industdal policy
guidance urd of the private sector for implementation. There is no ASEAN role for industrial
tugetrng.-64 Since AIPs are praçtically not functioning, while the AICs survive with the collaboration
of the private sector; the member states cari opt for giving more roles to be played by the private sectors
in industrial cooperation. In this regard, the AIWs c¿n be a guide, although they need to operate in an
environment of simpler procedures afid less bureaucratic red - tape.
As of now, one apparent weakness of ASEAN economic cooperation can be found in its
organizational structure. ASEAN economic cooperation falls under the responsibility of ASEAN
Economic Ministers, whose works are based upon the report of five committees:
i. Committee on Trade and Tourism (COTT)
ii. Commiuee on Industry, Minerals and Energy (COIME)
iii. Committee on Finance and Banking (COFAB)
iv. Committee on Food, Agriculture and Forestry (COFAF)
v. Committee on Transportation and Communications (COTAC)6j
Under this set up, two different committees are responsible for trade and industry where each of them
are merged with other economic subjects. This is indeed different from the realities of ASEAN
economic cooperation where trade and industry are being coordinated hand - in - hand. This
organization struçture also implies thât the coordination of various economic projects may be done ad
hoc. Tak,ng into account the current changes in ASEAN economic cooperation, a change of this
organizational structure should be logical. The much needed change is to have a specific committee on
trade and industry. This change can indeed help improve ASEAN's rnechanism since the second phase
in intra - ASEAN economic cooperation deals primarily with trade liberalization amongst the member
states.
eþ1¡!"p.747.
ós.Chattsrie€, inBroinowski, ed., op. cìt,, p, ó0.
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A TRANSITION TO ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
The economic cooperation which began since 1976 has provided the picture of a failed
collaboration. However, ASEAN leaders wer€ not bothered by this failure. They agreed on some other
projects which need further serious commitment from amongst themselves. The ã'd ASÉAN
Economic Ministers Meeting in l99l has agreed to carry out some new projeots, namely; the Common
Effeøive Preferential Treatment, the Growh Triangle çoncÆpt, the ASEAN Free Tr¿de Area; and the
signing up of the Framework Agreement on Ënhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation. This time
around, ASEAN did not discuss the possibilities to çreate new industrial projects which were
problematic in the first phase of its economic cooperation.
At the Fourth ASEAN Summit (1992), all the six heads of govemment spoke on the need for
greater ecortomic integration, as proposed by the 23d AEM, in the face of growing regionalism and the
prospect of more intense competition for foreign investment in the region. Singapore's Prime Minister
Goh Chok Tong referred to the single European market and the North American Free Trade Agreement
as "defining the new operating environment for ASEAI.[."6 He warned that unless ASEAN can match
these other regions in attractiveness, investment would start flowing away from the region. This
concern was also reflected in point 2 of the Singapore Declaration 1992:
"2. Having reviewed the profound international political and economic changes that have
occurred since the end of the Cold War and considered their implications for ASEAN, we
declare that:
o ASEAN shall constantly seek to safeguard its collective interests in response to the formation
of large and powerful economic groupings among the developed countries, in particular
through the promotion of an open international economic regime and by stimulating economic
cooperation in the region;...'ú7
The new economic programs as agreed upon in 1991 and 1992 showed that ASEAN was
willing to continuç improving the economio ties they have developed since 1976. Wirh the motivation
of strengthening its institutional - building and to react upon perceived loss of trade due to the growing
regionalism in other parts of the world, ASEAN established the Common Efective Preferential
Treatment, the Growth Triangle Concept, the ASEAN Free Trade fue4 and the Framework Agreement
on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation. A striking feature ofthese schemes in that ASEAI.{ did
6 Vatikiotis, Michael, "ASEAN: Actlon at Last " in Far Eastern Economic ßevlew, February 4 1992, p.l0.
rz. Singapote Declantionof 1992, in ASEAN Economic Bulletin, Vol. 8, No.3, Marcll.l9D2, p.376.
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not propose any new industrial project, the area it failed to progress substantially before. The following
sub - sections will provide a brief description on each of these projects, examine its progress, and
discuss some of the issues which arise in the process of implementing these programs.
The Common Effective Prefercntial lre¡tment
The Common Effective Preferential Treatment was suggested by Indonesia in the 23'd AEM in
1991. It çan be seen as Indonesia's concern over the eagerness of ASEAI.I member states toward
liberalization of ASEAN market without due consideration to economic realities of the member states.
The ration¿le for the CEPT is to allow member states to be ñrlly prepared for trade liberalization
through a tariff - cutting mechanism. In this observation of the Fourth ASEAI.I Summit, Mchael
Vatikiotis wrote, "[w]orking on the principle that ASEAN movçs as fast as its slowest member, CEPT
became the mechanism for establishing AFTA."68
The CEPT ptovides a framework in which by the set deadline, the tariffrates would be rril, or
at an mærimum, 5 percent. The Singapore Declaration of 1992 outlined fifteen groups of produots to be
included in the CEPT scheme for tariff reduotions: "vegetable oil, cement, chemicals, pharmaczuticals,
fertilizer, plastics, rubber products, lather products, pulp, textiles, ceramio and glass products, gem and
jewelry copper cathodes, electronics, and wooden and ruttan furniture.'6e
It should be duly noted that before the adoption of the CEPT scheme, ASEAI.I was referring to
the PTA as the mechanism to frcilitate intra - ASEAN trade. Howçver, unlike the PTA that remains an
ambiguous concept for its various requirements and the absence of a deadline, the CEPT establishes a
cle¿rer vision through its pre - negotiated tariff reduction and an agreed deadline. Another striking
difference is that the PTA is granted only by the nominating country without reciprocity, whereas
"...under CEPT there is reciprocþ in that once the good is 4ccepted by all countries or accepted subset
of countries (other countries to follow in three years), then all countrios or subset thereof must give the
preferential tariff.'70 In other words, the CEPT aims at providing a uniform preferential treaûnent for
the realization of intra - ASEAN trade liberalizatio
Sincæ the CEPT is viewed as reflecting the ASEAN economic realities, efforts to achieve its
objective have been gradual in nature. There are four tariffgroups at the beginning of this scheme: 0 -
5%, 5 - lÙyo, and 15 - 2lyt To be elþible for the CEPT, a product has to satisS three conditions:
e¿. Vatikiotis, op. cit,
0e'The Singapore Declaration of \992, op. cit,
70 Pangeshr, et. al,, op.,cit.. p.346,
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"the product has to be on the Inclusion List of both the exporting and importing country; it must have
an approved tariff reduction schedule, except for products with ta¡iffs already at or below 5 percent;
and it has to be an ASEAÀi product, with a local content requirernent of 40 percent, on a single country
or on a cumulative ASEAN basis."?r
Thc CEPT scheme, fr¡rthermore, is designed to be flexible so that member states can make
adjustments necessary for its attainment. In view of this, the scheme ¿llows member countries to
affange for exclusion lists, in whioh several items would be exempted from trading preferential. There
are three categories of exclusions: 'temporary exclusions, which will be reviewed after eight years;
general exceptions, on the grounds of national security, public morals, and so on; and unprocessed
agricultural produots."72 this exclusion list, however, would afrect the offectiveness of the CEPT, and
hence, AFTA. Pangestu, et.al., observed that such "...exclusion lists are reminiscent of the early days
of PTA ¿nd runs counter to the initial proposal of not having an exclusion list."73 The reason behind
having the exclusion lists was mainly due to the varying degrees of industrialization and the
unpreparedness of the member countries to surrender their national priority to the common trading
arrangements.
Another obvious issue in the CEPT is on the status of PTA in the presence of the CEPT. The
ASEAN economic ministers agreed that the two will be merged, but it is not cle¿r how this should
ocçur. Tho ways being considered by ASEAÌ,I a¡e to let both the schemes run parallel, or to place the
PTA under the CEPT. To avoid confrrsion, the preferred way would be "to subsume the PTA under the
CEPT since the latter is more encompassing."T4 However, no decision is made yet on the nature of the
merging of the two schemes. Despite its weakness, it should be acknowledged that this time around, the
member states have shown a positive sign by agreeing to commit themselves with a set deadline, which
is clearly missing in ASEAII{ collaborative efforts before.
Furthermore, "[t]he announcement of the schedule of tariff reductions which will occur in the future
will give businesses time to adjust and te restructure "75
n Lee Tsao Yuary "The ASEAN Free Trade Area; The Search for a Common Prosperity," in Garnaut, Ross and Peter
Drysdale, ed., (New South Walee:
HarperEducational, 7994), p, t27.
" IbiaLæ.Pangeshl, et. al., op, cil., p, M6.
,n|[id,p.M7.
73 l.,ee Tsao Yua+ op. cit,, p. !22,
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The Growth Triangler
The concept of Growth Triangles in Southeast Asia has existed even before it became an
ASEAN project in 1991, as agreed in the 23d AEM. Thc Singapore - Johor (Malaysia) - Riau
(Indonesia) ISUORI] Growth Triangle was already formalized in 1989. other proposed growth triangles
within ASEAN include: Penang (Maþsia) - Medan (Indonesia) - Phuket (Thailand); Eastern Acheh
(Indonesia) - Medan (Indonesia) - Penang (Malaysia); and Kalimantan (Indonesia) - Sabah (Malaysia)
- Mindanao (the Philippines).
The 'growth triangles' concept is an attempt at integration in the sub - regional level. It is a
test of willingrress on the part of the different states to exploit the complementarify of their economies.
In terms of SIJORI, Riau and Johor are excepted to provide land, labour and resources such as water;
whereas Singapore will provide the supponing infrastruøure suoh as finanee, transportation and
telçcommunications, skilled labour, management and access to the world market. Batam, an island in
the Riau groups of island, is thc main beneficiary of the project. It was declared a duty free zone in
1978, and "only whçn policy changes occurred in 1989 on the Indonesia side plus tacit support by the
Singapore government, did foreign investors (outside of oil - related activities) began to seriously
consider locating in Batam,"76 The policy change by the Indonesia government of allowing 100 percent
foreign investment in the island h¿s attracted foreign investors, especially from Singapore and Johor, to
set up industrial estates in Batam.
The growth triangles can help the less developed areas to exploit their potentials through the
help of their richer neighbours. Chia Siow Yue and Lee Tsao Yuan characterized SUORI as a
"metropolitan spillover into the hinterland'; essentially a gforilth pole spillover phenomenon in a
transnational context".77 Consequently, the main actor of this type of collaboration is understandably
the richest, i.e., Singapore. SIJORI can be viewed as stemming from a natural evolution of cooperation
between the tluee areas before it was formalized. Johor, the southernmost state of peninsular Malaysia,
has been suppþing water to Singapore since 1962. Singapore companies and subsidiaries, on the other
hand, have expended or reloeated to Johor for reasons ofrising costs, the unavailability oflabour, and
the shortages and rising costs, Batam became increasingly considered as an alternative.
The economic rationale for the promotion of SIJORI is that "it makes possible the
development of the subregion, capitalizing on the resource complementarity and geographic proximity
7ó.Pansestu. oo. cit,. o.339.
z Chia Siow Yue and Lee Tsai Yuan, "Subregional Econonric Zones in Southeast Asia," in Garnaut and Drydale, qp.
cít,. o.367.
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of the three component arêas."78 SUORI has an area of 20 000 square kilometres and a population of 5
million, with a range of GDPs per capita betwecn nearly US $ 4 000 in Johor, less than US $ I 000 in
Batarq to over US $ 12 500 in Singapore (see Table 5). In numerical terms, it seems to be ideal for
SIJORI to function wcll since it provides a certa¡n degree of complementarity to be accorded.
TABLE 5: Basic Indicatorcfor SIJORI Growth hiangle
Source: Chia Sow Yue and Lee Tsao Yuw, Subregional Economlc Zones in Sautheast lsl4 in Asia
Pacific Regionaliçm: Readings in International Economic Relations- (New South Wales: Harpet
Educational, 199a), p. 368.
In practioe, however, SIJORI fases various problems that are characteristic of other ASEAI{
econornic endeavours, At present, the rtature of its collaboration is not fully formalized. Under the
present set up, "there are two bilateral agreemçrits: between Singapore and Indonesia, and bøween
Singapore and lvfalaysia. However, there is no formal agf€ement botween lVfalaysia and Indonesia,"Te
Furthennore, in terms of investment and trade relations, Johor and Riau tend to be compøitive rather
than complernentary. Another problem relates to the faot thåt unlike Singapore ¿nd Batarq Johor is not
a free trade zone. In additiog "sitce Johor is a much mire substantial part of Malaysia than Riau
rel¿tive to the rest of Indonesia the dimensions of the problem are greater for Malaysia."e
ASEAN Free Trade Are¡
At the 23'd ASEAN Economic Ministers Meoting the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) was
proposed by Thailand, seconded by Singapore. The proposal was later discussed and agreed by the
heads of governmerit in the 4ú ASEAN Summit n l992.In the 23d AEI\A "singapore and lvlalaysia
had wholþ supported the FTA proposal. Indonesi¿ and the Philippines had some reservations on how
fast they should go."t In this regards, there exists a certain degree of hesitanoy amongst some member
states on the question of integration in economic sphere. Nonetheless, AFTA is by the most ambitious
project undertaken by ASEAITI. with the CEPT being the vehicle of AFTA ASEAN envisions to have a
fully liberalized ma¡ket bytheyear 2008.
ã lbid., p.3ó8,




A positive sign in ASEAN's economic collaboration can be found in the willingness of the
member states to set a deadline for the achievement of AFTA. The only disagreement that they have
.r,vas on when the deadline should be set. There were at least two proposed deadlines; Thailand
suggested a ten years deadline (2002), while ASEAN - ISIS82 proposed for a fifteen years one.83
Consequently, ASEAN heads of government opted the fifreen years deadline, but instead of the
proposed 2007,it s€t 2008 as the deadline so that needed preparations can be done before January 1,
1993. The decision to achieve AFTA in 15 years showed the influence of 'Eack - tu,io', the ASEAN -
ISIS, to the high - level decision - making in ASEAN.
With the CEPT as the modus in achieving AFTA another question arise: what is the scope of
AFTA? The ideal form of a free trade area is that a product from a country can move freely across the
border of the contracting states. However, this is not feasible in ASEAN becausç of the varying degrees
of economic gfor/vth of thc member states. Thus, two ôspects were considered: "first is whether an
across the board or sectoral approach is adopted, and second, which trade barriers are to be included"sa
Although across the board approach is easier to administer and more efficient, for reasons of
competitiveness in ASEAN market, the member states has adopted the seçtoral approach. Since free
trade is directed toward certain sectors, some other sectors are prone to be excluded. Here again, the
CEPT is needed as the forum for determining which sectors to be included, and to wh¿t extent should
be trade barriers.
Other issues that are sti[ plaguing AFTA include the status of non - tariffbaniers and the rule
of origin. As of now, "[m]any ASEAI.{ states deploy a wide range of non * tariff bariers including
domestic requiroments, discriminatory goveflrment procurement practices, lioensing for the distribution
ofcertain products, local content and countetpurohase requirements, and the often arbitrary application
of customs classification and valuations."ss The main problem in this issue is that there are no
comprehensive survey on the impact of these barriers to ASEAN economic cooperation. The non -
øriffbaniers remain to be re¡noved, thus making the accomplishmert of AFTA difficult.
Another unclear agteemeût in AFTA concerns with the rules of origin. For a product to be
considered as an ASEAN product, it has to have 40 percent of its content originated from ASEAN, but
"how the 40 percent is to be calculated has not been agreed to."86 The problem would arise when
sz ASEAN - ISIS ie a network of va¡toue Instihrtee of Shategic and Intemational Shrdies whlcl exist in ASEAN. it constantly
recom¡rænds to variou¡ ASEAN committeæ on aeveral policiee, ranging from po[tical, eæurity and eætromic.
83. Pângesht et. al., op. cit., p.345.
t+Y¿1¡"p.M6.
os.Ravehill, op. cit., p. 860,
8e'Akraemæ, Narongchai and David Stifel, "The Political economy of The ASEAN Fre Ttade Area," in Gamaut afld Drysdale, op.
crL p.333,
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products come from Singapore or Brunei. "As Singapore and Brunei are free ports, other ASËAN
states are concerned that goods originating outside the region will be diverted through these ports and
relabelled as ASEAN products."87 This lack of specificity in the question of rules of origin, therefore,
would be a sensitive matter since they are open to comrptiort and falsification of documents. ASEAI.I's
hesitancy to commit into specific provisions of the free trade agreentent implies that its member states
are not yet fully prepared to enter into regional economic integration. Ravenhill's observation of this
scena¡io further explains the mood in achieving AFTA:
"Contras! for instance, the dozen or so pagçs of the Singapore Declaration with the more than
I 000 pages of the North American Free Trado Agreemant. The consequence of this lack of detail in
the Singapore Declaration is that many keys issues are uffesôlved and will have to be negotiated at the
same time as the member states are scheduled to be implementing tariffreductions - causing AFTA to
be dubbed 'Agree First, Talk After'."88
AFTA's lack of specificity also led to a confirsion on its legal status. While other member
states view it as not being a treaty, the Thailand's legislature criticized its then prime minister who
signed the AFTA agreement for ignoring the legislative procçss in the country. The Thai House
comrnittee also charged "that Mr. Anand (then Prime Minister) signed the ag¡eement unilaterally,
without consulting the business sestor."se The committee believed that AFTA would hurt the Thai's
production of vegetable oil, plastic pallets, glass and mirror products, electrical goods, rubber products
and lesther goods. Prime Minister Anand, however, defended that "he \ryas authorized by a Cabinet
decision that did not need ratification."eo He was also defended by the Commerce ministry in which
onç of its highly placed official argued "that the AFTA agreements did not need ratification because
tley were extensions of existing ASEAIrI economic cooperation agreements."el Although this issue has
been resolved when the legislature finally agreed with Prime Minister Anand's signing of the
¿greement, the fact that it was brought up indicates that there was a misunderstanding amongst the
politicians in Thailand about the n¿ture of AFTA. It was ironic that this issue was raised in the very
state that originated the ideal of AFTA.
Despite all these problems, AFTA is given high expectation to help develop ASEAN to be a
prosperous market place. It will also help elevating ASEAN to be a motç attractive region for invçstors
87.Ravenhill. oo. cit., o.8f).
ß Ibid., p.859.




from outside the region because "måny foreigrr investors favoured liberalization of intra - regional
trade and welcome the prospect dor a region - wide market."e2 AFTA may also benefit ASEAN
producers as well. ASEAN's cooperation in reducing tariff and non * tariffbaniers through a free trade
area can strengthen the relationship of the member states' business sectors. Finally, the positive aspeø
of this anangemenq as rightly put by Ak¡asanee and Stifel, is that, 'ASEAN solidarity as exemplified
in AFTA - especially now that a general commitment has been made - will allow the group to have a
gteater say in the international community and to address its concern over the trading system."e3
The Fr¡mcwork Agreement on Enh¡ncing ASEAN Economic Cooperation
As stated before, ASEAII was u[prepared to commit itself into a more inwa¡d - looking
economic integration. This fact is further strengthened by the refusal of ASEAN member states to enter
into a treaty on Êoonomic cooperation. In the 23'd, the Philippines suggested that an ASEAN Economic
Treaty would be signed in the Fourth Summit (1992), However, this idea did not receive much support
since the member stðtes were reluctant to commit themselves into an internationally binding egfeement.
The meeting then, settled with a bless binding document, which was n¿med "The Framework
Agreemmt on Enhancing ASEAN Economic Cooperation," which was later sþed by the heads of
government at the Fourth summit in1992.
The agreement, although not binding, was written with the characteristic of a troaty. There are
fifteen 'articles' in this Èamework agfeement. Among the major points of the agreement are:
D Strengthening various areas of cooperation (e.g., trade, industry, finance, banking, food
agriculture, forestry, transportatioq and communication)
iÐ Strengthening cxt¡a - ASEAN economic cooperation
iii) Encouraging private sector participation
iv) Giving ASEAN Secretariat the function of a monitoring body, and
v) Enhancing sub - regional cooperation.ea
An interesting, if not ambitious, provision lies in Àticle 9, concerning 'Settlement of
Disputes.' The article stateg "[a]ny differences botween the Member States concerning the
interpretation or application of this Agreemerit or any affangem€nts arising there ftom shall, as far as
possible, be settled amicably between the parties. Whenever necessary an appropriate body shall be
e:.Ravenhill, op. cit.. p. E56,
eâ Akrasanee and Stifel, op. pit., p.329.
q For the full text of the "Framework Agreement on Enhancing ASEAN Economic CooperatiorL', see Appendix 3.
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designated for the settlement of disputes."es This provisio4 however is still vague because it did not
speci$, what kind of mechanism to be established in case of disputes. Rather, it ended up with an ad -
hoc approach to solve disputes when they cannot be settled by the parties involved.
The Future of the Second Phase in Intr¡ - ASEAN Economic Cooperation
The push toward economic integration in ASEAN is a hasty decision. Events following the
23'd AEM have shown that the member states are not well - prepared to venture into such
arrangements. The move toward achieving AFTA was also hindered by suspicions and the lack of trust
amgngst the member states. As Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines are developing
countries, they want to protect their market and some industries to remâin competitive. Therefore,
ASEAN's economic cooperation cannot be understood as ¿n effort to take advàntage of its economic
complementarity, as ASEAN wants other to believe. Rather, "the reasons liç rnore in the recent
developments of ASEAN economies, which have changed to cope with the new international trade and
investment trends."eó In this sense, the new phase in intra - ASEAN economic cooperation is
galvanized by economic motives which can be manifested in the large regional association.
the second phase of intra - ASEAN economic cooperation has also strengthened its
institution - building. The regular process of interaction amongst the member states has improved their
understanding in dealing with world economic issues. Today, ASEAN is one of the major players in
APEC. ASEAN member states agreed to participate in APEC subject to "their so called 'th¡ee noes':
that APEC has no legally binding authority, that it has no negotiating right, and that it pursue no
regional anangements beyond those reached in the GATT."e7 At the Second APEC Summit meeting in
Bogor, Indonesia (1994), ASEAIrI was suocessful in its attempt to get all members agreed for a dual -
deadline resolution for trade liberalization in APEC; 2010 for the dweloped, and 2020 for the
developing countries. In Osaka, Japan (1995), during the Third APEC Summit me€tiilg, it had again
successfully lobbied dor the adoption of an Action Agenda for APEC which is "voluntary and fleúble"
which means that "there is no obligation on any member to liber¿lize their ma¡kets, be it by 2010 or
2020,-et What ASEAI.I did here was to introduce the "ASEAÌ.{ way'' of decision making to the APEC
proc€ss. The message signalled by ASEAN was that APEC can have 6 timeframe, but the
eâ lbid.. o.384.
só'Akrasanee and Stifel, op. cit.. p.329.
e'Rudner, Martiru "APEC: The Challmges of Asian Pacific Economic Cooperation", in Modern Asian StudieÉ. Vol.
29, P afi. 2, May 7995, P. 413.
%. Kaur, Hardev, "A Lesson in Realism for APEC", ln Business Times (Malaysia), November 23, 7995, p.4.
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implementation should be pragmatic, taking into account the various levels of development amongst its
members. This also shows that ASEAN's institution - building efforts are significant in shaping its role
in a wider regional arrangement.
ASEAN's march toward economic integration through the vision of AFTA c¿n be rationalized
as its reaction toward the trends of economic regionalism in North America and Europe. The reaction
was to form its own grouping rather than waiting and calculating the costs and benefits of such trends.
ASEAI.{'s main weakness is that the member states of ASEAN seem to be coping other regions'
integrational measures (e.g., NAFTA and EC) without having a strong foundation for such efforts.
Prior to the establishment of AFTA statistics, as shown in Table 2 (page 14), indicated that intra -
ASEAN trade was minimal. In this sense, ASEAN was pursuing a somewhat ambiguous economic
integratio4 leading it to be labelled as having 'names first, substance later'.ee As a result, ASEAN
economic cooperation depends largely upon thç ensuing ad hoc negotiations and agreements after
certain projects ore adopted,
Attention in ASEAN is now being directed toward AFTA. It can be a measure to further
evaluate ASEAN economic integration. Only if AFTA fu8nøions well can ASEAN be said as being
successful in its integrational approach. In this regard, the CEPT's mode should be improved so that its
mechanism to eliminate tariff (and non - tarift) baniers can be effective þ the set deadline of
achieving AFTA. Still another aspect that ASEAN should consider is the position of Vietnam in
AFTA. As AFTA was formalizod prior to Vietnam's membership in ASEAN, an adjustment had been
made to facilitate Vietnam's position in AFTA. Under the arrang€ment, Hanoi agreed to participate in
AFTA "...after being gñmted the concession of ¿n additional three years to implement CEPT."100
lVhile working on AFTA and CEPT, it is indeed wise for ASEAN to carry on and improve its
subregional cooperatioq i.e., the gro\¡úth triangles. The growth triangles have proven to be giving more
immediate benefits and have less controversial issues. They can also forge greater understanding
among the states involved which may lead to consensus and compromise in other joint economic
endeavours.
s. füe for examplg langhammer, op. cit.. pp.737 - 138.
too ft¿y6ffill. oo. cit., o.86ó,
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CONCLUSION
Although intra - ASEAN economic cooperation measures were plagued by many problems,
the member states are still giving it considerable attention. It should be noted that issues in this area of
cooperation involve only the degree ofsuccess or failure ofsuch cooperation and the feasibility ofits
projects, and not the survival of the associatíon. ASEAN remains to be a major player in the Southeast
Asian rogion because of the understanding amongst its elites. To borrow Marjorie Suriyamongkol's
term, ASEA}ù leaders play the 'politics of avoidance and the rhetoric of unity'rol in their continued
optimism for the various collaborative efforts. In the meantime, however, no serious controversies had
arisen from this cooperation. In so far Es the cooperation is unsuccessful, its failure does not lead
ASEAN into confliø amongst the member states. The various issues faced by ASEAN indicate rhat the
member stàtes are willing to cooperate in economic areas, but at the same time, opting for some
degrees of protectionism for their own national resilience and economic growth.
This paper has evaluated the progress of various efforts to achieve economic integration in
ASEAN, since some of its prograrns, pðrticularly after the 23'{ AEM Meeting in 1991, appeared to
have the characters of eoonomic integration. As this researth has shown, ASEAN is not integrating its
econorny despite the eústence of AFTA and CEPT. Although there are some efforts to integrate
ASEAN's economy, at present, it is unlikely. This is due to factors such as the heterogeneous nature of
the region, economies which still need a certain degree of protection for sweral products, and weak
organizational structure. A new perspective on intra - ASEAì.I economic cooperatior¡ is therefore, a
perspective of paradox; the insistence of ASEAN to continue with economic cooperation in spite of
relative failure in the pre - 1991 economic collaboration.
The new economic cooperation rteasures as agreed in l99l have provided a new raison d'être
for ASEAN's existence. The outcome of these efforts will largely depend upon the effectiveness of the
CEPT as a tarifr- cutting mechanism. Ta achieve AFTA, the ta¡iff rates should be in the range of 0 - 5
percent by 2008. The main problem faced by ASEAN at the moment is the tendency to delay the
implementation of programs already agreed by the organization. A brighter spot in the second phase of
intra - ASEAN economic oooperation, nonetheless, lies in the growth triangle concept.
101' See Suriyamongkof Mariorie L., Politics of ASEAN Economic Cooperation, (Singapore: Oxford Univeraity Press,
1988), pp.52 - 56.
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This sub - regional arrangement can be moro effective than other programs since its focus is smaller
and it is designed to exploit economic complementarity between the participating economic areas. The
absence of a legally - binding document to facilitate all these mechanisms is, on the one hand, a
hindrance for the achievement of a liberalized ASEAN market. On the other hand, it also requires the
strengthening of institution - building amongst ASEAN member states through deliberation of ways to
improve the achiwement of the aims and goals of the projects.
The main stumbling block in intra - ASEAN economic cooperation, as pointed out by many
observers (Nayq Langhammer, Ravenhill, Pangestu, to name but a few), is the member states' political
will. ASEAII's progress in adopting various progmm¡ are often handicapped by the inability of the
leaders to implement them for suspicions of other states' commitment. The case in point are the various
industrial cooperation adopted since 1976 (AIPs, AICs, AIWs). Politícal commitment remains to be a
serious issug and ASEANI economic initiatíves will depend much upon the willingness of the member
states to sacrifice for the successful implementation of their economic programs, Alongside political
\¡vill, ASEAN should remain committed to its concept of open regionalism. For its eoonomies to enjoy
further Srowth; while strengthening its economic cooperation, it has to remain open to intern¿tional
trade and extra - ASEAN cooperation.
ASEAN has gone a long way in its two phases of intra - regional economic cooperation. Intra
- ASEAN economiç cooporation, as this paper shows, is motivated by institution - building and as a
reaction toward economic regionalism elsewhere, However, both rationales cannot ensure the success
of ASEAN's visions to integrato the regional ec,onomy. The challenge for ASEAN is to translate its
visions lnto workable economic mechanisms tlrough unswerving political commitment and honouring
the many egteements made to achieve a truly libçralized economy in Southeast Asian region. ASEAN
should also learn from its past mistakes so that it will not repeat them in the process of accomplishing
an ASEAN Free Trade Area by the year 2008.
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APPENDD( 1
DECLARATION OF ASEAII CONCONI)
A Common Bond Existlng among the
Member States of the Association
of Southeast Asi¡n Nation¡
The President of the Republic of Indonesia, the Prime Minister of Malaysia, the President of
the Republic of the Philippines, the Prime minister of the Republic of Singapore and the Prime
Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand,
REAFFIRM their commitment to the Declarations of Bandung, Nagkolq and Kuala Lumpur,
and the Charter ofthe United Nations:
ENDEAVOUR to promote peace, progress, prosperity and the welfare of the peoples of
member states,
UNDERTAKE to consolidate the achievements of ASEAN and expand ASEAN cooperation
in the economic, social, cultural and political fields;
DO I{EREBYDECLARE
ASEAN cooperation shall take into açcount, among others, the following objectives and
principles in the pursuit of political stabilþ:
L The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution to
international peace and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate tkeats posed by
subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience.
2. Member states, individually and collectively, shall take into active steps for the early
establishment of the Zone ofPeace, Freedom and Neutrality.
3. The elimination of poverty, hunger, disease and illiteracy is a primary concem of member
states. They shall therefore intensi$ cooperation in economic and social development,
with particular emphasis on the promotion of social justice and on the improvement of the
living standards of their peoples.
4. Natural disasters and other major calamities can retard the pace of development of member
states. They shall extend, within their capabilities, assistance for relief of member states in
distress.
5. Member states shall take cooperation action in their national and regional development
programmes, utilizing æ far as possible the resources available in the ASEAN rçgron to
broaden the complementarity of their respective economies.
6. Member states, in the spirit of ASEAN solidarity, shall rely exclusively on peaceful
processes in the settlement ofintra - regional differences.
7. Member states shall strive, individually and collectively, to create conditions conducive to
the promotion of poaceful cooperation among the nations of Southeast Asia on the basis of
mutual respect and mutual benefit.
8. Member states shall vigorously develop an awareness of regional identity and exert all
efrorts to create a strong ASEAN community, respected by all and respecting all nations on
the basis of mutual advantageous relationships, and in accordance with the principles of
self determination, sovereþ equality and no - interference in the international afFairs of
nations.
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AND DO HEF.EBY ADOPT
The following programme of action as a ftamework for ASEAN cooperation:
A. Political
l. Meeting ofthe Heads of Government of the member states as and when necessary.
2. Signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia.
3. settlement if intra - regional dispute by peaceful means as soon as possible.
4. Immediate consideration of initial steps towards recognition and respect for the Zone of
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality wherever possible.
5. Improvement of ASEAN machinery to strengthen politioal cooperation,
6. Study en how to develop judicial cooperation including the possibility of an ASEAN
Extradition Treaty.
7. Strengtherting of political solidarity by promoting the harmonisation of views, coordinating
position and, where possible and desirable, taking common actions.
B. Economic
1. Cooperation on Basic Comnodities, particularþ Food and Energy
x Member states shall assist each other by according priority to the supply of the
individual country's needs in critical circumstanceg and priority to the acquisition of
exports from member states, in respect of basic commodities, particularly food and
energy.
x Member states shall also intensiff cooperation in the production of basic
oommodities particularþ food and energy in the individu¿l member states of the
region.
2. IndustrialCooperation
x Member states shall cooperate to establish large - scale ASEAN industrial plants,
particulady to meet rçgional requirements of essential commodities.
x Priority shall be given to projects which utilize the available materials in the member
states, contribute to the increasç of food produøio4 increase foreign exchange
earnings or save foreþ exchange and create employmeff.
3. Cooperation in Trade
x Member states shall cooperate in the fields of trade in order to promote development
and growth of new production and trade and to improve the trade structures of
individual states and among countries of ASEAN conducive to furthçr development
and to safeguard and increæe their foreþ exchange earnings and reserves.
x Member states shall progress towards the establishment of preferential trading
arrangements as a long term objective on a basis deemed to be at any particular time
appropriate through rounds of negotiations zubject to the unanimous agreement of
member states.
N The oxpansion of trade among member states shall be facilit¿ted through cooperation
on basic commodilies, particularly in food and energy and through cooperation in
ASEAN industrial projeçts.
x Member states shall accelerate joint efforts to irnprove access to ma¡kets outside
ASEAN for their raw materials and finished products by seeking the elimination of
all trade baniers in those markets, developing nolv usage for these products and in
adopting corltmon approaches and actions in dealing with the regional grouping and
individual economic powers.
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x Such cfforts shall also lead to cooperfltion in the field oftechnology and production
methods in order to increase the production and to improve the quality of export
productg as well as to develop new export products with a view to diversity exports.
4. Joint Àpproach to International Commodity Problems and other \ilorld Economic
Problems
N The principle of ASEAN cooperation on trade shall also be reflected on a priority
basis in joint approaches to international commodþ problems and other world
economic problems such as the reform of international trading system, the reform of
international monetary system and tra¡sfer of real resources, in the United Nations
and other relevant for a, with a view to contributing to the establishment of the New
international Economic Order.
x Member states shall give priority to the stabitisation and increâse of export earning of
those comtnodities produced and exported by them through commodþ ag¡eements
including buffer stock schemes and other means,
5. Machlnery for Dconomic Cooperation
Ministerial meetings on economic matters shall be held regularly or as deemed neÆ€ssary
in order to:
x Formulate recommendâtions for the consideration of Governments of member states
for the strengthening of ASEAN economic cooperation.
x Review the coordination and implementation of agteed ASEAN programmes and
projects on economic cooperation.
x Exchange views and consult on national development plants and policies as a step
towards harntonising regional development; and
x Perform such other relevant functions as agreed upon by the member Governments.
C. Soclal
l. Cooperation in the field of social development with emphasis on the well - being of the
low - income group and of the rural populatiorq though the expansion of opportunities for
productive employment with the fair remuneration.
2. Support for the active involvement of all seclors and levels of the ASEAN communities,
particularly the women and youtt¡ in development efforts.
3. Intensification and expansion of existing cooperation in meeting the problems of
population growth in the ASEAN region, and where possible, formulation of new
strategies in collaboration with appropriate intemational agencies.
4. Intensification of cooperation among member st¿tes as well as with the relevant
international bodies in the prevmtion and eradication of the abuse of narcotics and the
illegal traffcking of drugs.
D. Cultur¡l and Information
l. Introduction of the study of ASEAN, its member states and their national languages as part
of the curricula of schools and other institutions of learning in the member states.
2. Support of ASEAN scholars, writers. Artists and mass media representatives to enable
them to play an active role in fostering a sense of regional identity and fellowship.




Continuation of cooperation on a non - ASEAN basis between the member states in security
matters in accordance with the mutual needs and intçrests.
F. Improvements of ASEAìI Machinery
l. Signing of the Agreement on the Est¿blishment of the ASËAN Secretariat.
2. Regular review of the ASEAN organizational structure with a view to improving its
effectiveness.
3. Study of the desirability of a new constitutional ftamework for ASEAN.
DONE ¿t Denpasar, Bali, this twönty - fourth day of February in the year one thousand nine
hundred and seventy - six.
SOURCE: compiled




TIIE TWENTY - THIRD MEETING OF TEE ASEAN
ECONOII{IC MII\IISTERS
KUALA LUMPU& MALAYSIA, 7 _ 8 OCTOBER T99I
I The Twenty - Third Meeting of the ASEAN Economic Ministers (AEM) was held in Kuala
Lumpur, Malaysia on 7 - 8 October 1991. The Meeting was formally opened by the Right
Honorable Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia and was preceded
by a preparatory Meeting of the ASEAN Senior Economic Officials (SEOM) on 4 - 5 October
t991
2 The Meeting was attended by H,E. Pehin Dato Abdul Rahman Taib, Mnister of Industry and
Primary Resources of Brunei Darussalaq H.E. Dr. Arifin M. Siregar Minister of Trade of
Indonesia; H.E. Mr. Hartarto, Minister of Industry of Indonesia; H.E. Dato' Seri Rafidah Azia
Minister of International Trade and Industry of Malaysia; H.E. Mr. Chua Jui Meng, Deputy
Minister of International Trade and Industry of Malaysia; H.E. Mr. Peter D. Gamrcho, Jr.,
Secretary of Trade and Industry of Philippines; H.E. B.G. (Rtd.) Lee Hsien Loong, Deputy
Prime Minister and Ministø of Trade and Industry of Singapore; H.E. Mr. Lim Boon Hørg,
Senior Minister of State for Trade and Industry of Singapore; H.E, Mr. Amaret Sila - On
Minister of Comrnerce of Thailand; H.E. Mr. Virabongsa Ramangkura, Deputy Minister of
Finance of Thailand; H.E. Mr. Vira Susangkarakan Deputy Mnister of Industry of Thailand
and their respective delegations. H.E. Mr. Rusli Noor, secretsry general of ASEAI.I Secretariat
and members of his staffwere also present,
3 The Right Honourable Dato' Seri Dr. Mahathir Mohamad in this Keynote Address
cornmented on ASEAN's achievement in economic c.ooperation against the backdrop of rapid
$owth of the economy of ASEAN members which have benefited from a free economic and
trading environment. The Prime Mnister expressed concern over the information of trade
blocs in the West and emphasized that in the interest of the world economy, the Uruguay
Round shquld be brought to a successful conclusion. In acknowledging the fact that ASEAN
on its own is not strong enough to protect free trade, he stressed the need to work together
with the East Asiur Economies through the information of the East Asian Economic Group
(EAEG) which will be GATT - consistent, compatible with APEC, and not detrimental to
ASEAN's cohesiveness. The Prime Minister made it clear that the EAEG should not be a
trade bloc and should instead stand for free trade. He welcomed the proposal by the Prime
Ministcr of Thailand for an ASEAN Free Tr¿de Atea. He pointed out that the private sector
would have to be more efficient and assume a greater role in promoting economic cooperation
in order to benefit from the economic liberalization policies being implomented by ASEAN
member countries. The Prime Minister expressed concern over the use of environmental
issues to burden the ASEAN economies. He pointed out the dangers of using these issues ¿s
leverage in trade negotiations. The Prime Minister advocated cooperation between developed
and developing countries to solve this problern, rather than resorting to confrontational
campaigns. He emphasized the need for ASEAN to speak with one voice. The Prime Minister
cautioned that efforts to forge closer ASEAN economic cooperation should be complemented
by strengthening ASEAN's own machinery. In this context, he ernphasized the rreed to
revamp the ASEAN Secret¿riat considering its important role in ensuring that various
decisions, particularly of an economic nature are made expeditiously and implemented.
4 H. E. Dato' Seri Rafidah Anq leader of Malaysian Delagatior¡ and H.E.M¡. Peter D.
Gamrcho, Jr,, Leader of the Philippines Delegation were elected Chairman and Vice *
Chairman of the Twenty - Third Meeting ofthe AEM respectively.
5 The Ministers reviewed the activities undertaken during the past year to implement the
decisions of the Third ASEAN Summit.
6 The Ministers noted the fast - changing economio and political environment within and
outside the ASEAN region, which presents new challenges and opportunities. They were
aware of the need for ASEAN to adopt timely and effective measures to strengthen its intra -
and extra*ASEAM
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7 The Ministers held exensive discussions on the new initiatives proposed by ASEAN member
countries namely, the Common EfFective Preferential Tariffs (CEPT) Arrangement, the
"Growth Triangle" concept, the establishment of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), the
ASEAN treaty of economic cooperation as well as the ongoing efforts to improve the ASEAN
Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA) scheme.
8 The Mnisters agreed that the new initiatives embody element which are inter - related and
intended to expand trade and investment cooperation among ASEAN member countries. In
this regard, the Ministers decided to treat the new initiatives as part and parcel of an integrated
package towards the creation of a truly liberalized market.
9 The Ministers, in acknowledging the inter - relationship of the new initiatives, agreed that all
member countries should subscribe to the establishment of the ASEAN Free Trade Area
(AFTA) simultaneously so as to create within the time frame of 15 years a truly liberalized
ASEAN market with the Common Effective Preferential Taritr (CEPT) in the range of 0 - 5
pçrcent for manufactured produøs. They also agreed that the AFTA shall be efected mainly
through the CEPT scheme, while the improved Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA)
scheme will continue to be applied as a complementary tool.
l0 The Ministers agreed that the establishment of AFTA with the applications of CEPT on a
sectoral basis within the definite time - frame would serve the interest of all member
countries, accommodate the respective national conditions and requirements. Leads to the
emergence of ASEAN region as a truly liberalized market, and maintain ASEAN's relevance
in the world at large beyond the 1990's.
I I The Ministers agreed to a Framework Agreement ti implement the various initiatives for the
expansion of ASEAN trade, investment and economic cooperation. They assigrred the Senior
Officials to work out the form and substance of the Framework Agreement to be signed at the
Fourth ASEAN Summit.
12 The Mnisters acknowledged that the "Growth Triangle" concept is a sub - regional
flffangement which complernents the overall ASEAN economic cooperation. They assigned
the Senior Officials to work out the form and substance of the Framework Agreement to be
signed at to Fourth ASEAN Summit.
13 Recognizing the importance of strengthening the existing ASEAN vehioles, parlicularly the
system of ASEAN dialogue partners, in promoting economic cooperation with third countries
and multilateral organizations, the Ministers agreed to convening of East Asian economies and
to meet as and when the need arises. They agreed that such a Caucus would:
e Expand intra - regional cooperation in East Asia which holds vast potentials to
further enhance the dynamism of regional economies and, consequenlly, contribute
significantly to the support and promotion of an open and ftee global trading system.
The initiative would provide the necessary collective approach in areas of mutual
concern in international economic fora; and
B Not be an institutionalised entity and would not be a trading bloc.
14 The Mnisters noted the progress ofthe APEC process.
15 The Ministers agreed that officials pursue the establishment of consultative mechanisms
between ASEAII and other dialogue partners in order to enhance trade and economic
cooperation with them.
16 The Ministers also reviewed the progress of the activities of the ASEAN Economic
Commiuees since their last meeting in Bali [n October, 1990.
17 The Ministers acknowledged that mernber countries have liberalized their foreign exchange
des and increasingly used ASEAI.{ currencies as settlement currencies. They also noted the
status of the ASEA|{ - Japan Development Fund (AJDF) and called for member countries to
make use of the regional project portion in addition to the utilization of the respective
allocations for national projeøs. The Ministers also agreed that cooperation in the area of
capital market development be further developed.
18 Regarding ASEA}I cooperation on food, agricultural and forestry, the Ministers approved the
new projects proposals submitted by the ASEAN Committee on Food, Agriculture and
Forestry (COFAF). They noted the continuing efforts by ASEAN member countries to counter
the Anti - Tropical Timber Campaþ.
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19 The Ministers endorsed the text of a protocol to amend the revised Basic Agreement on AIJV
in which ASEAN agrees, among others, on the efension of at least 90 percent Margin of
Preferences (MOP) to AIJV pfoducts so as to achieve Common Effective Preferential Tariff
(CEPT) of 0 - 5 percent, the Common Rate of which is to be agreed upon by particþating
countries. The Ministers also endorsod the following products in the Approval List of the
AIJV products;
e Enamel (Irtdonesia and Malaysia);
€ Heavy Equipment (Conditional agreement by Indonesia and Malaysia);
I Aluminium Hydroxide (Indonesia and Thailand);
Ð Brealdast Ce¡eals (all ASEAN countries);
I Soya - based milk, soyex and meat analogue (all ASEAN countries);
Ð Chocolate wafers, drageeg bouillon tablets (all ASEAI.{ countries);
e Non - dairy creamer (all ASEAN countries);
I Soya sauce powder (all ASEAN countries).
20 The lvfinisters agreed to extend the Brand - to - Brand Complementation scheme to non -
automotive products.
2l The Ministers çndorsed the ASEAN Program of Action in Transportation and
Communication, as the basis for frrture cooperation.
22 The Mnisters reviewed the progress of ASEAN trade cooperation with particular emphasis on
the improvement of the Preferential trading Arrangement (PTA) Scheme. They took into
account the independent studies on the PTA since the Thírd ASEAN Summit and noted that
all member counüies would meet the target set by the Third ASEAN Summit, The Ministers
also noted that all member oountries have confirmed their respective programmes and product
lists for 1992,
23 The Ministers agreed to the following measures for the improvemants to the PTA programme:
e To further deepen MOP of edsting PTA items;
I To further reduce the items in the exclusion lists; and
I For all member countries to reduce ASEAN content requirement to 40 percent for the
first five years. At the end of the fifth yeâr this would be reviewed with a view of
raising it back to the original 50 percent.
24 The Ministers noted that a progfess report ort the visit ASEA¡{ Ye,ar 1992 and the post 1992
tourism initiatives would be presented at the 4ú ASEAN Summit.
25 On ASEAI.{'s external relations, the Ministers emphasized that the form and substance of
ASEAN's relations with third countries, and international and regional organizations need to
be in line with the changing international political and economic environment.
26 The Ministers reaffirmed their strong commitment to a successfi.¡l conclusion of the Uruguay
Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (URN{TN). They urged the major trading economies
to adopt gÍeater flocibility to contribute to the success of the URMTN.
27 The Ministers expressed concern over increasing support and protectionism by industrialized
countries for their agricultural sector through farm subsidies. They emphasÞed the need for
ASEAN to project a stronger voice against farm subsidies thnough joint efforts of member
countries and closer consultation with the Cairns Group.
28 The Mnisters noted th¿t the Anti - Tropical Timber campaign still went on unabated. They
felt that ASEAN should continue cooperation efforts with the develop countries to resolve this
problem on the basis of shared responsibility and bøter understanding.
29 The Ministers expressed their serious concern over the use of environmental issues as â
pretext to impose trade restrictive measures on developing çountries.
30 The Mnisters noted increasing trend of trade restrictive measures in the form of anti -
dumping and countervailing duties. They agreed that ASEAI.{ should continue to monitor this
trend and have close consultatiôn on appropriate steps to counter the trade restrictive
mgasures.
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3l The Ministers noted the Report of the Penal of the Five Eminent Person on "Strengthening the
Structure and Mechanism of the ASEÆ{ Machinery with Special Reforence to the ASEAN
Secretariat". They agreed that any measures adopted should be in accordancc with goals nnd
requirements of ASEAN activitiÊs.
32 The Mnisters expressed their appreciation to the ASEAN - CCI for its recommendations to
enhanoe ASEAN eoonomic cooperation. They urged the ASEAN - CCI to take a more açtive
involvement in existing ASEAIiI economic activities as well as the new initiatives being
proposed.
33 The Nßnisters vrere briefed by Singapore on ths preparation for Fourth ASEAN Summit
which will be held in Singapore in January 1992.
34 The Ministers agreed to hold the Twanty - Fourth AEM Meeting in the Philippines in 1992.
35 The Mnisters expressed their most gratçful appreciation to the Right Honorable Dato' Seri
Dr. Mahathir Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia, for his Keynote Address, setting out the
guidance for their deliberation.
36 The delegations of Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand
expressed appreciation to the Government and people of Malaysia for the warm hospitality
extended to them and the excellent arrangeÍients made for the meeting.
37 The Meeting was held in the spirit of ASEAì{ cordiality, solidarity, and a sensç of
pragmatism.
SOURCE:
compiled and edited by Paul Davidsoq (New York: Oceana Publications, 1995).
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APPENDD( 3
FRAMEWORK AGREEil{ENT ON EI{HANCING ASEAN ECONOIUIC COOPERAfiON
The Sultan of Brunei Darussalam, the President of the Republic of Indonesi4 the Prime Minister of
Malaysia, the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the Prime Minister of the Republic of
Singapore and the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Thailand:
REAFFIRMING their commitment to the ASEAN Declaration of 8 August 1967, the
Declaration of ASEAN Concord of 24 February 1976, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia of 24 February 1976, the 1977 Accord of Kuala Lumpur and the Manila Declaration of
l5 December 1987;
DESIRING to enhance intra * ASBAN economic cooperation to sustain the economic gfou¡th
and development of all Member States which are essential to the stabilþ and prosperity of the region;
REITERATING their commitment to the principles of the C¡eneral Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (hereinafter refered to as GATT);
RECOGNISING that tariff and non - teriffba¡riers are impediments to intra - ASEAN trade
and investment flows, and that existlng cornmitments to remove these trade ba¡riers could be
extensively improved upon;
NOTING the significant unilateral efforts made by Member States in recerit years to liberalise
trade and promote investments, and the importance of extending such policies to furthçr open up their
economies; given the comparative advantages and complementary of their economies;
RECOGNISING that Membsr States, having different economic interests, could beneñt from
sub - regional arrangements;
CONSCIOUS of the rapid and pervasive changes in the international political and economic
landscape as well as both cohesive and effeøive performance of intra - ASEANI economic cooperation;
MINDFUL of the need to extend the spirit of friendship and cooperation among Member
States to other regional economies, as well as those outside the region which contribute to the overall
economic development of Member States;
RECOGNISING further the importance of enhancing other fields of economic cooperation
such as in science and technology, agriculture, financial services and tourism;
HAVE AGREED AS FOLLOWS:
Article l: Principles
e Member States shall endeavour to strengthen their economic cooperation throrgh an outward -
looking attitude so that their cooperation contributes to the promotion of global trade
liberalisation,
0 Member $tates shall abide by the prinoiples of mutual benefit in the implementation of measures
or initiative aimed at enhancing ASEAN economic cooperation.
6 All Member St¿tes shall participate in intra - ASEAN economic arrangements. However, in the
implementation of these economic arrangements, t\ilo or more Member States may proceed first if
other Member States are not ready to implement these anangements.
Article 2: Areas of Cooperation
A. Cooperation in Trade
g All Member States agreo to establish and participate in the ASEAN Free Trade A¡ea
(AFTA) within 15 years. A ministerial - level Council will be set up to supervise,
coordinate and review the implementation of the AFTA.
e The Common Effective Preferenti¿l Taritr (CEPT) Scherne shall be the main rnechanism
for the AFTA. For products not covered by the CEPT Scheme, the ASEAN Preferential
Trading Arrangements @TA) or any mechanism to be agreed upon, may be used.
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Ð Member States shall reduce or eliminate non - tariff barriers between and among each
other on the import and export of products as specifically agreed upon undçr existing
arrangements arising out of this Agreement.
e Member States shall explore further measures on border and non - border areas qf
cooperâtion to supplement and complement the liberalisation of trade.
B. Cooperation in Industry, Minerals and Energy
€ Member States agree to increase investments, industrial linkages and complementarity by
adopting new and innovative measures, as well as strengfhening existing arrangements in
ASEAN.
Ð Member States shall provide flexibility for new forrns of industrial cooperation. ASEAN
shall strengthen cooperation in the development of the minerals secfor.
Ð Member States shall enhance oooperation in the field of energy, inoluding energy
planning, exchange of information, transfer of technology, research and development,
manpower training, çonservation and efficiency, and the exploratio4 production and
supply of energy resources.
C. Cooperation in Finance and Banking
I Member States shall strengthen and develop further ASEAN economic cooperation in the
field of capital markets, as well as find new meâsures to increase cooperatíon in this area,
@ Member Søtes shall encourage and facilitate free movement of capiøl and other
financial resources, including further liberalisation of the use of ASEAN çurrencies in
trade and investments, taking into account their respective national laws, monetary
controls and development objectives,
D. Cooperation in Food, Agriculture and Forestry
@ Member States agfee to strengthen regional cooperation in the areas of development,
production and promotion of agricultural products for ensuring food security and
upgading information exchanges in ASEAN.
e Member States agree to enhance technical joint cooperation to better manage, conserve,
develop and market forest resourçes.
E. Cooperation in Transportation and Communications
@ Mernber States agfee to fufher enhance regional cooperation for providing safe, efficient
and innovative transportation and communications infrastructure network.
€ Member States shall also continue to improve and develop intra - country postal and
telecommunications system to provide cost -- effective, high qualþ and consumer *
oriented services,
Article 3: Olher Areas of Cooperation
l. Member States agree to increase cooperation in research and development, technology
transfer, tourism promotio4 human resource development and other economic - related areas.
Full account shall also be taken of existing ASEAÌrI arrangements in these areas.
2. Member States, through the appropriate ASEAN bodies, shall regularly con$ult and exchange
views on regional and international developments ând trendg and identifr ASEAN priorities
and challenges.
Article 4: Sub - regional Economic Artangements
Member States acknowledge that sub - regional arraûgements among themselves, or between
ASEAN Member Stâtes ad no - ASEAN economies, could complement overall ASEAN economio
cooperation.
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A¡ticle 5: Extra - ASEAN Economic Cooperatlon
To complement and enhance eçonomic cooperation among Member States, and to respond to
the rapidly changing external conditions urd trends in both the economic and political fields, Member
States agree to establish and / or strengfhen cooperation with other countries, as well as regional anô
international organizations and arrangements.
Article 6: Private Sector Participation
Member States recognise the complementarity of trade and investment opportunities, and
thøefore encouñage, among others, cooperation and exchanges among the ASEAN private sectors and
between ASEAN and non - ASEAÌrI private sectors, and the consideration of appropriate polioies
aimed at promoting gfeater intra * ASEAN and extra - ASEAN invesfments and other economic
activities.
Article 7: Monitoring Bdy
The ASEAN Secretariat shall function as the body responsible for monitoring the progress of
any arrangements arising from this Agreement. Member States shall cooperate with the ASEAII
Secretariat in the performance of its duties.
Article 8: Reviw of Progress
The ASEAN Economic Ministers' Meeting and its subsidiary bodies shall review the progress
of implementation and cooperation of the elements çontained in this Agreønent.
Article 9: Settlement of Disputes
Any ditrerences between the Member States concerning the interprøation or application of
this Agreement or any arrangements arising there from shall, as far as possible, bs settled amicably
between the parties. Whenever necessary, and appropriate body shall be designated for the settlement
ofdisputes.
Article l0 Supplementqry Agreemenls or Arrangements
Appropriate ASEAN economic agreements or arrangementq arising from this Agreement,
shall form an integral part ofthis Agreement.
Artiole ll: Other Arrangements
A. This Agreement or any action takçn under it shall not afest the rights and obligæions of the
Member State¡ under any existing âgfeements to which they are pârties.
B. Nothing in this Agreement shall affect the power of Member States to enter into other
agte€ments not contr¡!ry to the terms and objectives of this Agreement.
Article 72: Generql Exceptions
Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent any Member States from taking action and adopting
measures which it considers neçessary for the protection of its ¡ational security, the protection of
public morals, the protection of humar¡ animal or plant life and healtb and the protection of articles of
artistic, historic and archaeological value.
Article I3'. Amenùnents
All Articles of this Agreement may be modifies through amendments to this Agreoment
agreed upon by all the Member Statos. All amendments shall become effeøive upon acceptance by all
Member States.
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A¡ticle 14: Entry into Force
This agreement shall be e,û[ective upon siping,
Article 15: Finol Provision
This Agreement shall be deposited with the Seoretary General of the ASEAI.I Seoreta¡iat who
shall promptly furnish a certified copy thereof to each Mcmber States.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersígrred have signed this Framework Agreement on
Enhancing ASEÆ.[ Economic Qooperation.
DONE in Singapore on the 28ú day of January lgg2 na single copy in English Language.
Source: ASEAI.{ Eqonomic Bulletin Vol. 8, No. 3, March 1992, pp.381 - 385
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APPENDD(4
Table A.I: Trade Bal¡nce of Select€d ASEAN Countúcs
SOURCE: Boutir¡ I.D. Kenneth, "Statistical Appendix', in Acharya" Amitav andRichard Stubbq ed.,




TøbIe A,2:l¡g¡ - ASEAN Ttade: Amount of Trade with Other ASEAN States and
Percentage of Total Trade
Indo¡reiiá 1;989,00 4,066,6A '1,096120 2,257.5t, [730,00 2+401-10
1L5t7o 12.60e/o' 9.40Yt \t70I¡ 8,20e/o g:8A%' \ß,20%
Phtlippilres
1,62V;90 1.,567.X) t,Wß.6O 1.,L73.90 3,904.70 2Æû4.30
12,A0% l&,20e/o, 18:20% 14.5A?6, 72.20Yo 17.4Ðlo
SOURCE: Boutin, J. D. Kenneth, "Statistical Appendix", in Acharya, Amitav and Richard
Str.rbbs, ed., New Challenges for ASEAN:
Emerging Policv Issuep, (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1995), p.208.
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APPENDD( 6 ; Initial Research Proposal
INTRA-ASEAN ECONOMIC COOPERATION.
STATTMENT OF RESAARCH OBJECTTVE
The Association of Southe¿st Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed in 1967 with the main
objective of facilitating economic and cultural cooperation among the member states. ASEAN's
original members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. It was later
joined by Brunei in 1984 and Vietnam in 1995, the motivating factor for the establishment of ASEAN
was twofold * to foster economic and cultural cooperation; and to maintain security in the Southeast
Asian region.
As a regional organizatior¡ ASEAN has, since 1967, attempted to intensi$ its economic
cooperation between the member states. Among its various attempts were to forget greater
interdependence through inoreasing intra - regional trade and lifting tariffbaniers. Projects such as the
19S2 ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture (AIfV), a joint investment project âmong the private sectors; the
1980 ASEAI{ Industrial Projects (AIPs), as a resource - pooling and market - sharing initiative; and
the Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTAs) are examples of ways in which ASEAN has sought to
increase economic cooporation,
ASEAI.{'s economic cooperation entered a nôì/v phase in 1991, following the ASEAN
Economic Mnisters (AEM) Meeting in Kuala Lumpur. The meeting agreed upon the implementation
of a new trading arangement - the Common Effective Preferential Tre¿tment (CEPT), the creation of
an ASEAN Free Trade fuea (AFTA) and the adoption of an East Asian Economic Çaucus (EAEC) as
an ASEAN project. The agreement achieved in this meeting has changed the nature of economic
cooperation in the region - from a loose cooperation to a significant degree of economic integration in
the region. Therefore, this research seeks to examine the transformation from ASEAN's agreement of
economic cooperalion to the fostering of regional economic inlegralion.
55-
STATEMENT OF RESEARCH METHOI)
Since it is almost impossible to identi$ a single factor contributing to the trends of
integration, it can be argued that this process stems out of two inter - related factors, namely; a gradual
transformation approach (institution - building), and as a reaction to the global economic trends toward
economic grouping. This paper will also attempt at understanding the various issues in ASEAN
economic integration and its position in the wider economic transformation in the Asia - Pacific region,
The naturç of this research will be mostly descriptive. However, it will also deal with the
theoretical aspects of regionalism and çconomic integration. Moreover, it will analyse the current
issues in the ASEAITI economic relations in the light of contemporary trends in economic regionalism.
This research will be divided into four main components:
l. historical background and theoretical perspectives
2. economic cooperation since 1976
3. economic integration since l99l
4. analysis of ASEAN's efforts and achievements in the economic field.
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES TO BE USEI)
In terms of sourceg it will depend on existing literature on ASEÆ.{'s economic and foreþ
relations. This research will also çonsider curtent journals and newspaper articles on
perspectives of ASEAI.I economic integration. Furthermore, it will also examine the official
documents ofvarious ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting ¿nd ASEAN Summit.
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